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 Abstract  
 
In healthcare sector, the move towards Electronic Health Records (EHR) systems has 
been accelerating in parallel with the increased adoption of IoT and smart devices. 
This is driven by the anticipated advantages for patients and healthcare providers. The 
integration of EHR and IoT makes it highly heterogenous in terms of devices, network 
standard, platforms, types data, connectivity, etc. Additionally, it introduces security, 
patient and data privacy, and trust challenges. To address such challenges, this thesis 
proposes an architecture that combines biometric-based blockchain technology with 
the EHR system. More specifically, this thesis describes a mechanism that uses 
patient’s fingerprint for recovery of patient’s access control on their EHRs securely 
without compromising their privacy and identity. A secure distributed healthcare 
system (SDHCARE) is proposed to uniquely identify patients, enable them to control 
access to, and ensure recoverable access to their EHRs that are exchanged and 
synchronized between distributed healthcare providers. The system takes into account 
the security and privacy requirements of Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) compliance, and it overcomes the challenges of using 
secret keys as patient’s identity to control access to EHRs. The system used distributed 
architecture with two layers being local to each healthcare provider that is member of 
SDHCARE, and two layers shared across all members of SDCHARE system. 
SDHCARE system was prototyped and implemented in order to validate its functional 
requirements, security requirements and to evaluate its performance. The results 
indicated successful fulfillment of design requirements without significant overhead 
on the performance as required by healthcare environments.  
 
Keywords: Blockchain, Healthcare, EHR, Fingerprint, Biometric, Access Control. 
 iiv
 
 
 
 
 )cibarA ni( tcartsbA dna eltiT
 
  نملآا عزوملا ةیحصلا ةیاعرلا ماظن
 صخلملا
 ةینورتكللإا ةیحصلا تلاجسلا ةمظنأ وحن كرحتلا ناك ،ةیحصلا ةیاعرلا عاطق يف
 ایازملاب عوفدم اذھ و ،ةیكذلا ةزھجلأاو ءایشلأا تنرتنإ دامتعا ةدایز عم يزاوتلاب عراستی (RHE)
 تلاجسلا جمد نإف ةوجرملا ایازملا نم مغرلا ىلع و ،ةیحصلا ةیاعرلا يمدقمو ىضرملل ةعقوتملا
 رایعمو ،ةزھجلأا ثیح نم ةیاغلل ةسناجتم ریغ اھلعجی ءایشلأا تنرتنإ عم ةینورتكللإا ةیحصلا
 ةیصوصخ ىلإ ةفاضإ ،كلذ ىلإ امو ،لاصتلااو ،تانایبلا عاونأو ،ةیساسلأا ةمظنلأاو ،ةكبشلا
 عمجت ةینب ةحورطلأا هذھ حرتقت ،تایدحتلا هذھ ةھجاومل و ،ةقثلا تایدحتو ،تانایبلاو ضیرملا
 ةحورطلأا هذھ فصت ،ًادیدحت .RHE ماظنو ةیویحلا سییاقملا ىلإ ةدنتسملا نیشتكولبلا ةینقت نیب
 نود و نامأب RHE ةصاخلا ةیحصلا ھتلاجس يف مكحتلا ةداعتسلا ضیرملا ةمصب مدختست ةیلآ
 دیدحتل (ERACHDS) نمآ عزوم ةیحص ةیاعر ماظن حرتقی ثیح ،ھتیوھو ھتیصوصخب ساسملا
 لوصولا نامضو ،ةیحصلا مھتلاجس ىلإ لوصولا يف مكحتلا نم مھنیكمتو ،دیرف لكشب ىضرملا
 نیب اھتنمازمو اھلدابت متی يتلا مھب ةصاخلا ةینورتكللإا ةیحصلا تلاجسلا ىلإ دادرتسلال لباقلا
 ةیصوصخلاو ناملأا تابلطتم رابتعلاا يف ماظنلا ذخأی و ،ةعزوملا ةیحصلا ةیاعرلا يمدقم
 مادختسا تایدحت ىلع بلغتیو ،(AAPIH) ةلءاسملاو يحصلا نیمأتلا ةیلباق نوناقل لاثتملال
 مدختسی و .ةینورتكللإا ةیحصلا تلاجسلا ىلإ لوصولا يف مكحتلل ضیرملا ةیوھك ةیرسلا حیتافملا
 نیتقبطو ،ERACHDS يف وضع ةیحص ةیاعر مدقم لكل نیتیلحم نیتقبط عم ةعزوم ةینب ماظنلا
 ققحتلا لجأ نم ھقیبطتو ماظنلا میمصت مت ثیح ،ERAHCDS ماظن ءاضعأ عیمج ربع نیتكرتشم
 میمصتلا تابلطتم قیقحت ىلإ جئاتنلا تراشأ و ،ھئادأ مییقتو ناملأا تابلطتمو ةیفیظولا ھتابلطتم نم
 .ةیحصلا ةیاعرلا تائیب يف بولطم وھ امك ءادلأا ىلع ةریبك ءابعأ نود حاجنب
 ،ةیرتمویبلا ،عباصلأا تامصب ،RHE ،ةیحصلا ةیاعرلاو ،نیشتكولبلا :ةیسیئرلا ثحبلا میھافم
 .لوصولا يف مكحتلا
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
In the healthcare sector, the move towards electronic health record (EHR) 
systems has been accelerating in parallel with the increased adoption of IoT and smart 
devices. This is driven by the anticipated advantages for patients and healthcare 
providers. The Office of the National Coordinator (ONC) for Health Information 
Technology within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [1], defined 
EHR as “a digital version of a patient’s paper chart. EHRs are real-time, patient-
centered records that make information available instantly and securely to authorized 
users. While an EHR does contain the medical and treatment histories of patients, an 
EHR system is built to go beyond standard clinical data collected in a provider’s office 
and can be inclusive of a broader view of a patient’s care. They are built to share 
information with other health care providers, such as laboratories and specialists, so 
they contain information from all the clinicians involved in the patient’s care".   
 
Some advantages of EHR systems as indicated by ONC [1] are: 
• They maintain and synchronize patients’ medical history, diagnoses, medications, 
treatment plans, immunization dates, allergies, radiology images, and laboratory 
and test results 
• They allow access to evidence-based tools that providers can use to make decisions 
about patients’ care 
• They automate and streamline provider workflow 
In 2009, the U.S. government passed the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act) to motivate the adoption and 
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meaningful use of EHR systems. Additionally, they included this objective in the 
Federal Health IT Strategic Plan [2]. Figure 1 represents the progress of EHR system 
adoption in the United States since 2001. 
 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of EHR Systems Adoption in US 
 
In parallel with the move towards EHR healthcare systems, Blockchain 
technology was introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2009 [3]. Blockchain technology 
has received significant attention from the research community. Blockchain’s 
decentralized nature along with its cryptographic services increased its potential to be 
the future platform for distributed systems. The initial phase of Blockchain technology 
was limited to the financial sector and mainly focused on cryptocurrency such as 
Bitcoin, which has evolved to become the most popular cryptocurrency application. 
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Over time, Blockchain technology has evolved with the introduction of 
Ethereum and its smart contracts capability Buterin [4], which provides the 
programmability component of Ethereum Blockchain. This step gave Blockchain 
technology huge potential and expanded its scope from the financial to other sectors, 
including healthcare, education, government, and manufacturing. In particular, for the 
healthcare sector and EHR systems, Blockchain technology offers many capabilities 
that can fulfill several EHR requirements, as described by McGhin, Choo, Liu, and He 
[5], and summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Summary of EHR Requirements and Blockchain Opportunities 
EHR Requirements Blockchain Opportunities 
System security, including 
authentication, integrity, access control, 
and non-repudiation for multiparty 
integrated EHR systems  
Security, assurance, and immutability 
are provided using cryptography, 
namely private and public keys 
combined with hash-chaining between 
blocks of data 
Interoperability between different EHR 
standards implemented by various 
healthcare providers, research entities, 
insurance providers, and pharmacies 
Smart contracts capability provides an 
abstraction layer to enable 
communication among miners in 
distributed healthcare providers running 
different EHR standards  
Data sharing of health records  The decentralized architecture allows 
multiple entities to share health records 
Mobility of healthcare systems with the 
introduction of IoT and smart devices 
that allow patients to share and access 
their health records 
Shared data across distributed ledgers 
enables near real-time updates across the 
network to all parties 
Availability of the healthcare system The technology provides high 
availability and resilience through its 
decentralized model of operation 
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The close convergence between EHR requirements and Blockchain 
capabilities listed in Table 1 is a key driver that has led many proposals to include 
Blockchain-based EHR applications, including EHR monitoring and auditing, 
mobility applications, and exchange of information. 
Despite the promising convergence between Blockchain and EHR systems, 
some limitations have been identified regarding the integration between Blockchain 
and EHR systems, specifically:  
• Key management in current implementations of Blockchain are based 
on private/public key pairs. In Blockchain-based EHR systems, patients 
that use their private keys as their identities to control access to and to 
sign their EHRs are subject to permanent loss of access to their records 
in the case of lost private keys, as discussed in McGhin [5]. This is 
because, in asymmetric cryptography, a private key is not recoverable 
from the public key (computationally infeasible). 
• The lack of standardization for various deployments of Blockchain in 
healthcare systems generates a challenge regarding the interoperability 
and exchange of EHRs, which limits the success of deployments [5]. 
• There is the potential for privacy leakage due to the unencrypted nature 
of blocks that hold information related to patients’ health. Even with 
encrypted blocks, the ability to access the blocks publicly, in public 
ledgers, makes them subject to cryptanalysis attacks, which can exploit 
patients’ privacy if the encryption algorithms are compromised [5]. 
• Scalability and IoT overhead can occur due to the increased number of 
medical IoT devices and medical sensors joining the Blockchain 
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network. The more IoT devices joining the Blockchain network, the 
more the computational complexity of the ledger, which leads to the 
need for more computational power on these IoT devices. However, 
these IoT devices have very limited computational capabilities and are 
not designed to support the complex operations required by Blockchain 
hashing algorithms [5].   
• Blockchain entails security vulnerabilities, which are discussed in 
detail in Section 1.5.2.  
Accordingly, the scope of the present thesis focuses on investigating solutions 
to overcome the privacy leakage and key recovery challenges. Specifically, the focus 
is on finding a solution that enables blockchain-based synchronization and exchange 
of EHRs between distributed healthcare providers while: 
• Ensuring recoverable access to patients’ EHRs 
• Maintaining the unique patients’ identities in EHRs  
• Controlling access to EHRs 
• Providing anonymity to patients’ EHRs in the datastores 
• Detecting any modifications to EHRs, and 
• Logging any activities on EHRs. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
There are several limitations when deploying Blockchain technology in the 
healthcare industry, as detailed in Section 1.1. The problem statement targeted by this 
research is patients’ inability to recover access to their EHR records in the case of 
missing patient identities. This can occur in many cases such as lost private keys or 
emergency access to EHRs by unauthorized healthcare providers.  
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1.3 Research Objectives  
The core objective of this research project is to propose an EHR exchange and 
synchronization system based on Blockchain that can provide patients with an access 
recovery mechanism to their EHRs. In addition to this objective, the proposed system 
fulfills the requirements of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA Act). These legislative requirements include the authentication of access to 
EHRs, maintenance of EHR isolation and privacy for each patient, guaranteed integrity 
of EHRs, governance of access control to EHRs, and guaranteed audit logs for 
patient’s EHRs.  
1.4 Research Methodology 
This section describes the methodology followed to conduct the research 
project. The methodology was structured in a logical order to enable gaining in-depth 
knowledge about the research topic, and divided into several phases: 
• A literature review to understand the status of current research on 
Blockchain-based EHR systems and identify areas for research.  
• Verification of the uniqueness of the proposal to address the issues 
presented in the statement of the problem. 
• Development of high-level design architecture of the proposed solution 
followed by a low-level design.  
• A prototype of the proposed design, using Python and Ethereum, to 
simulate the functional and security requirements.  
• Analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed solution from 
functional and security perspectives. 
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Google Scholar was used to search several bibliographic databases for 
literature related to the current state of research on blockchain in healthcare. The search 
string deployed was: 
Blockchain AND (Healthcare OR EHR) AND (source: ieee OR source: springer OR 
source: acm OR source: sage OR source: Elsevier). 
The output from Google Scholar identified 3,390 papers, of which 3,210 papers 
were published since 2015. 
Initially, only review papers were considered to obtain an overall 
understanding of current research. Only top five cited papers were considered for the 
literature review. These papers were obtained using the UAEU E-Library, which 
provides access to the selected databases used in the Google Scholar filter.  
From the initial results, the identified papers were classified into three main 
categories:  
• Blockchain core technology – Top five cited papers 
• Blockchain security – Top five cited papers 
• Blockchain in healthcare – Top 10 cited papers 
From this review, limitations in the existing blockchain-based EHR proposals 
were identified, forming the scope of research for the present thesis.  
Google Scholar was consulted again to identify literature related to the use of 
biometrics in Blockchain deployment in healthcare. One paper was identified that 
details the use of Fuzzy Vault combined with photoplethysmogram (PPG) signals for 
key management (see Section 1.5.3). 
The next step was to specify the high-level design requirements and 
assumptions to build a low-level proposal. The following design requirements were 
considered: 
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• Provide a distributed platform to exchange and replicate EHRs 
• Ensure unique patient identity across the platform 
• Ensure unique EHR-to-patient mapping   
• Ensure patient validation to EHR access control requests.  
• Provide an access recovery mechanism for patients’ EHRs 
• Implement audit logging for access requests to EHRs 
• Provide an EHR integrity validation mechanism 
• Provide a mechanism for emergency access to EHRs by non-authorized 
providers 
• Ensure the anonymity of EHRs in the datastore across the platform 
Additionally, some assumptions were made that were excluded from the design 
requirements: 
• All healthcare providers must use the SDHCARE system. 
• All EHRs must be recorded in the same format (e.g., HL7 or FHIR).  
• Secure links are used for communication between healthcare providers, 
the Blockchain and the datastore. 
Based on the above requirements and assumptions, the low-level design 
proposal was developed. More details are provided in Chapter 2.  
The next phase was a prototyping phase to build a sample that can implement 
the required functional and security features of SDHCARE. The low-level design 
blocks were analyzed, and the tools and software required to provide the desired 
features and functions for each design block were identified. The final selection of 
tools was based on the following criteria: 
• Feature richness and simplicity of the tool. 
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• Security capabilities of the tool. 
• Compatibility and interoperability between the tool and other 
components of the SDHCARE system.  
The final phase of the research was testing and results analysis. This was 
divided into two sections: 
• Validating that design requirements were achieved and can provide the 
expected functions. 
• Performance evaluation to measure the average time and speed of 
transactions across the SDHCARE system.  
The details of system prototyping, implementation, and testing are covered in 
Chapters 3 and 4.  
1.5 Literature Review 
This section covers the literature related to blockchain technology and its 
adoption in EHR systems.  The reviewed literature covers the progress of research in 
the following areas: 
• Blockchain core functionality 
• Blockchain security capabilities and limitations 
• Limitations of legacy centralized EHR systems 
• EHR security, privacy, and compliance requirements 
• Existing proposals for Blockchain-based EHR systems 
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Table 2: Summary of the Literature 
Category Literature List 
Blockchain Technology Nakamoto [3], Buterin [4], Weber [8], Yaga, Mell, Roby, and Scarfone [9] 
Blockchain Security 
Joshi, Han, and Wang [7], Halpin and Piekarska [10], 
Zhong, Zhong, Mi, Zhang, and Xiang [12], Cash and 
Bassiouni [13], Tosh et al. [14] 
Blockchain in Healthcare 
McGhin, Choo, Liu, and He [5], Magyar [15], 
Pilkington [16], Zhang, Walker, White, Schmidt, and 
Lenz [17], Dagher, Mohler, Milojkovic, and Marella 
[18], Azaria, Ekblaw, Vieira, and Lippman [19], Xia, 
Sifah, Smahi, Amofa, and Zhang [20], Yang et al. 
[21], Roehrs, da Costa, and da Rosa Righi [22], Fan, 
Wang, Ren, Li, and Yang [23] 
 
1.5.1 Blockchain Basics 
According to the US National Institute of Standardization and Technology 
(NIST), Blockchain is defined as:  
Distributed digital ledgers of cryptographically signed transactions that are 
grouped into blocks. Each block is cryptographically linked to the previous one 
(making it tamper evident) after validation and undergoing a consensus 
decision. As new blocks are added, older blocks become more difficult to 
modify (creating tamper resistance). New blocks are replicated across copies 
of the ledger within the network, and any conflicts are resolved automatically 
using established rules [6].  
The entire blockchain is stored in each miner (as single unit) for 
synchronization instead of storing individual blocks. Figure 2 providers an overview 
of the structure of the blocks. 
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Figure 2: General Chain of Block
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1.5.1.1 Block Components  
Joshi, Han, and Wang [7] described the structure of the block as follows.  
• Data: This is the application data held in the distributed blocks. The block 
can hold any type of data and is thus application-independent. Further, the 
block can hold multiple data units from diverse types of applications. Each 
data unit in the block is called a ‘message’ or a ‘transaction’.  
• Hash: In a single block, three types of hash values exist: the hash value of 
the previous block (which is used to chain the blocks), the root hash 
representing all transactions stored in the block, and the hash value of the 
current block at the time it is committed to the chain.  
• Timestamp: The timestamp at which the block was added to the chain. 
• Other information: This includes information such as the software version 
used by the miner and the current difficulty level. An essential information 
element called a ‘nonce’ is used for block validation and the consensus 
algorithm.  Figure 3 depicts this structure. 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Block Structure 
 
1.5.1.2 Types of Blockchains 
Types of blockchains are defined according to how miners join the Blockchain 
network. Joshi, Han, and Wang [7] classified Blockchain networks as follows:   
• Public Blockchain (permissionless): This type of Blockchain is publicly 
accessible without permissions or restrictions, eliminating the limitations 
of a central authority. Any node running the mining software (such as 
GETH for Ethereum Blockchain) can participate and start adding blocks, 
executing the consensus algorithm, voting to discard blocks, and obtaining 
access to any unencrypted information stored in the blocks.  
• Private Blockchain (permissioned): This type of Blockchain is a 
permission-based platform established by a group of firms, individual 
firms, or divisions within a firm in which data can be accessed by users that 
are part of the mining group and properly authenticated.  
Hash 
(Current and Previous)
TimeStamp
Other Information
Data 1 …. Data N
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• Consortium Blockchain: The consortium Blockchain is a hybrid between 
the no single trusted entity model of public Blockchain and the single, 
highly trustable entity model of private Blockchain. It is perceived as a 
partially decentralized Blockchain.  
1.5.1.3 Transaction Lifecycle  
The lifecycle of transactions varies depending on the type of Blockchain.  For 
example, in Ethereum, Weber et al. [8] summarized the transaction lifecycle as 
follows:  
• The sender prepares its transaction with the application data and sends it to 
its local miner. The sender signs the transaction with its private key, which 
is validated by the local miner. 
• The local miner generates a transaction ID and broadcasts the ID to the pool 
of miners. This transaction ID is a hash value of the hashed transaction. 
• The miners maintain a pool of queued transactions. This queue is generally 
sorted based on the fees (called gas) paid by senders to process their 
transactions. Miners prefer to pick transactions with higher incentives 
(higher gas).  
• Once a miner picks a certain number of queued transactions, it builds a 
block to include them. Next, the miner attempts to solve a crypto-puzzle to 
be elected to broadcast the block (This is called the consensus algorithm 
and varies based on the type of Blockchain. Ethereum uses a proof of work 
(POW) algorithm for consensus that is based on solving crypto-puzzles).  
• Upon successful puzzle resolution, the miner posts the block in the 
Blockchain and waits for confirmation from other miners on the block that 
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it is committed to the main chain. Ethereum considers the presence of 12 
proceeding blocks after the committed block as confirmation.  
1.5.1.4 Blockchain Consensus  
Yaga, Mell, Roby, and Scarfone [9] described consensus as the process that 
determines which user publishes the next block. Different models of consensus are 
used in Blockchains. These vary between CPU-intensive models, which is suitable for 
permissionless Blockchains for additional security, and low CPU models, which is 
suitable for permissioned Blockchains that assume a level of trust between miners. 
Some commonly-used consensus models are listed by [9]. The following sections 
describe the different models used in Blockchain for reaching consensus. 
1.5.1.4.1 Proof of Work (POW) 
In the POW model, a complex crypto-puzzle is published to all miners in the 
Blockchain. The first miner that solves the puzzle is granted permission to publish its 
blocks. The miner has to submit the solved puzzle as a “proof”, which is validated by 
other miners, and then the block is accepted. The difficulty of the puzzle varies and is 
continuously adjusted to maintain an average block committing time (e.g. 10 minutes 
in Bitcoin). Accordingly, POW is considered highly CPU-intensive and is usually used 
in permissionless Blockchains to reduce attackers’ interests in participating. 
1.5.1.4.2 Proof of Stack (POS) 
The POS model uses the amount of stack that miners invest in the system as an 
indication of their genuine intention and disinterest in compromising the Blockchain. 
The actual stack of the Blockchain varies based on its type, but cryptocurrency is 
generally used. The miners invest in the cryptocurrency of the Blockchain, which is 
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unusable expect for being a measure of their trust.  
This model is currently being evaluated in permissionless Blockchains as it 
eliminates the high computational requirements of the POW model.  
1.5.1.4.3 Proof of Authority (POA) 
The POA model is based on maintaining a level of trust between miners and is 
used only in permissioned Blockchains. This level of trust is established through 
proven identities, which are verified by Blockchain members (e.g., authorized 
documents). During Blockchain runtime, the reputation of miners varies depending on 
their behavior, number of accepted blocks, and other factors. Miners with a better 
reputation will be awarded more slots to publish blocks while malicious miners will 
not be awarded sufficient slots to publish blocks.  
1.5.1.4.4 Round Robin Consensus 
Similar to the POA model, round robin consensus is limited to permissioned 
Blockchains. In this model, miners are awarded equal slots to submit blocks. An 
advantage of this model is that it guarantees that no miner can create a majority of 
blocks without the need for complex computation for validation. 
1.5.2 Blockchain Security 
In this section confidentially, integrity and availability (CIA) aspects of 
blockchain technology are investigated, as well as some common attacks against 
blockchain.  
1.5.2.1 Confidentiality  
According to NIST [6], confidentiality refers to “preserving authorized 
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restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting 
personal privacy and proprietary information”. Hence, confidentiality is focused on 
authorization and privacy.  
NIST [6] defines authorization as “access privileges granted to a user, program, 
or process or the act of granting those privileges”, which is not a feature natively 
provided by Blockchain technology. Similarly, privacy is not a native feature of 
Blockchain. Current implementations of Blockchain technology do not have the 
capability of encrypting the contents of the blocks or transactions before committing 
them to the ledger. The lack of authorization and privacy can introduce a substantial 
risk of a malicious miner joining the mining pool, obtaining a copy of the blocks and 
analyzing/exploiting their vulnerabilities. An example of this is the decentralized 
autonomous organization (DOA) attack [10]. DAO was an application developed and 
executed in Ethereum blockchain with the purpose of maintaining financial 
contributions for blockchain-based applications. It had an identity verification 
vulnerability which was exploited in 2016, leading to compromised security and losses 
totaling more than US$50 million [11]. Lack of privacy and authorization allowed the 
attacker to read DOA blocks and identify the vulnerability. 
Zhong, Zhong, Mi, Zhang, and Xiang [12] proposed a new model of privacy-
protected Blockchain that encrypts data within an agreed upon time to add privacy 
capability to the technology. Cash and Bassiouni [13] proposed a two-tier Blockchain 
network that provides permissionless Blockchain at tier-1 with a POW consensus 
algorithm and permissioned Blockchain at tier-2 with a POA consensus algorithm. In 
this model, tier-2 provides access control to data specific to data owners and the users 
with whom they are sharing the data. Nodes from the permissionless tier can be 
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members of tier-2, which allows them to pass data and make transactions according to 
pre-defined access control contracts. 
1.5.2.2 Integrity 
NIST [6] defines integrity as “guarding against improper information 
modification or destruction and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and 
authenticity”. Nakamoto [3] explained how Blockchain technology implements strict 
integrity verification to avoid manipulation and tampering of data inside the blocks. 
This is implemented at three levels: the transaction, block, and miner level.  
• At the transaction level, each miner verifies the hash value of the received 
transactions. Only valid transactions are queued in the block to be published in 
the ledger. The miner uses the sender’s public key to verify the received 
transaction hash value against the locally calculated value. Thus, this 
eliminates spoofing of senders’ public keys. 
• At the block level, the miner uses the hash values of all transactions to calculate 
the root hash value that represents all transactions in the block (Bitcoin uses 
the Merkle tree while Ethereum uses the Patricia tree). The miner will use the 
hash value of the last block in the ledger, the root hash of the queued block, 
and the nonce value to calculate the local block hash. This nested hashing 
represents the actual chaining of the blocks and ensures blockchain integrity 
because tampering in any block will require a change in the hash values of all 
proceeding blocks in the ledger. Altering one block and all proceeding blocks 
is required before a new block is published in the ledger. Figure 4 below shows 
the detection of data tampering at the block level. 
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Figure 4: The Effects of Tampering with One Block in the Ledger 
 
• At the miner level, for each new block, the miner verifies the block hash before 
accepting it in the ledger as the new last block. Further, the miner verifies the 
order of the new block by comparing the hash reference of the current last block 
in the ledger against the value listed in the new block.  A block that fails the 
integrity check by miners or is placed out of order will be discarded if the 
majority of miners vote for the same result (i.e., more than 51% of miners vote 
to discard the block). 
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The nested hashing within the block and between blocks in the ledger 
guarantees the integrity of the data stored in Blockchain and makes it immutable 
(irreversible). This capability requires a thorough evaluation of the data policy before 
posting it on the Blockchain. If sensitive data such as medical records are encrypted 
and stored in the Blockchain and the encryption algorithm is later exploited, there 
could be significant exposure of sensitive information that cannot be revoked. Another 
example is a DOA attack where the Ethereum community cannot revoke the vulnerable 
DOA code without forking the ledger (i.e., discarding all the data inserted after the 
vulnerable DOA code).  
1.5.2.3 Availability 
Availability is defined by NIST [6] as “ensuring timely and reliable access to 
and use of information”. Availability is well implemented in Blockchain technology. 
The distributed architecture of the Blockchain network and the synchronization of the 
entire Blockchain across all miners in the pool provides robust resilience against 
single-point-of-failure scenarios. Failure in one or more node(s) does not stop the 
Blockchain network from introducing new blocks to the chain and/or serving access 
requests to the existing blocks. However, failure could impact the availability of the 
applications utilizing Blockchain.  
Weber et al. [8] investigated the availability provided by Blockchain from an 
applications perspective. The research is focused on how the availability of 
Blockchain-based applications is affected by the time required to post a transaction on 
Blockchain. Using a sample of transactions from the Ethereum and Bitcoin 
Blockchains, Weber et al. found that 61.5% of transactions took more than 3 minutes 
to be committed in a Blockchain, while 13.8% of the transactions took more than 4.5 
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minutes to be committed. Such variation in time can introduce the unavailability of 
client applications.  
Additionally, Weber et al. [8] investigated the factors that can influence the 
delay to commit transactions. Some of these are common between Ethereum and 
Bitcoin while others are unique to each, as indicated in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Factors for Blockchain Transaction Delay Variation 
 Ethereum Bitcoin 
Transaction fees paid by the client  ✔ ✔ 
Transactions’ order of arrival ✔ ✔ 
Locktimes: indicating that a transaction is invalid 
until a certain block sequence number is mined 
 ✔ 
Network delays ✔ ✔ 
Gas limit (per block) ✔  
 
Weber et al. [8] analyzed the impact of DOS attacks on Ethereum Blockchain 
and found that the measures currently implemented by Ethereum that use a gas limit 
counter DOS attacks and provide strong availability for smart contract applications.  
1.5.2.4 Common Blockchain Attacks 
Over time, different techniques have been used to attack active Blockchains, 
including Ethereum and Bitcoin. These attacks have targeted the core Blockchain 
technology rather than the applications running on the Blockchain (application attacks 
are subject to the vulnerabilities in applications). Tosh et al. [14] analyzed attacks on 
permissionless Blockchains that utilize POW as their consensus algorithm (the same 
attacks apply to permissioned Blockchains with lower risk due to the controlled 
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admission of miners). The following section reviews the literature on common attacks 
on Blockchain. 
1.5.2.4.1 Double-spend Attack 
In a double-spend attack, the same cryptocurrency (e.g., bitcoins) for more than 
one transaction. A malicious miner spends a certain number of bitcoins, for example, 
at block i.  Starting from block i, the malicious miner privately mines to extend the 
Blockchain as fast as possible without publicizing it. The private chain does not 
include the bitcoins spent by the attacker in block i. Once the private chain (malicious) 
is longer (i.e., has more mined blocks) than the public chain (genuine), the malicious 
miner posts the malicious chain, which appears as a fork. Miners vote to resume the 
malicious chain and discard the genuine chain because the malicious chain is longer 
(which means that genuine transactions are discarded starting from block i, and the 
same bitcoins can be reused for other transactions).     
1.5.2.4.2 Selfish Mining Attack  
In a selfish mining attack, a pool of malicious miners colludes to mine together 
(which increases their hashing power) and distributes the incentives among 
themselves. This increases their profitability by enabling them to receive regular 
incentives (because they dominate the Blockchain with their hashing power) instead 
of receiving random incentives when mining independently. At the same time, it 
reduces the profitability of honest miners. Honest miners may prefer to join an honest 
pool to increase their mining power compared to a selfish pool, generating higher 
incentives. Thus, the pool eventually becomes the major player controlling the 
Blockchain, and decentralization no longer holds. 
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1.5.2.4.3 Eclipse Attack 
An eclipse attack is aimed at isolating Blockchain miners and hijacking their 
mining power to form a malicious pool of miners controlled by the attacker. This 
malicious pool can be used to generate a fork and commit malicious blocks (i.e., 
overwrite the decentralization of Blockchain). Each miner in the ledger is limited to a 
certain number of concurrent, outgoing peers to maintain the peer-to-peer network 
(Bitcoin implementation limits each node to eight outgoing connection peers while 
Ethereum limits this to 11). In addition, it can accept a certain number of unsolicited 
incoming connections to form peers on the node’s public IP (Bitcoin allows up to 117 
connections).  
Considering Bitcoin, each miner maintains a table of IPs for incoming peers 
sending unsolicited requests. The miner selects eight peers from the table to initiate 
outgoing connections. The selection of IPs is systematic (not random). An attacker can 
rapidly and repeatedly initiate unsolicited connection requests to the victim’s node 
from attacker-controlled nodes. The victim’s node populates its table with attacker-
controlled miners’ IPs. The attacker continues to overwhelm the victim’s node with 
irrelevant information until it restarts. With such effort, there is a high chance that the 
victim will have the eight outgoing connections to attacker-controlled nodes after 
restarting, which isolates the victim from an honest pool, as indicated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Eclipse Attack 
 
1.5.2.4.4 Block Withholding Attack  
In this type of attack, some pool members who have joined to help mining 
blocks never publish any blocks, thus decreasing the expected revenue of the pool. 
1.5.2.4.5 Block Discarding Attack and Difficulty Raising Attack 
Block discarding and difficulty raising attacks rely on the attacker’s hashing 
power to mine blocks faster than others in the ledger, which leads to an increase of 
complexity, affecting the performance of the Blockchain network [14].  
1.5.3 Blockchain in Healthcare 
 The literature reviewed in this section covers the challenges, capabilities, and 
some proposed implementations of blockchain in EHR, specifically: 
• The challenges in integrating existing legacy centralized EHR systems 
• The required capabilities in any blockchain-based EHR systems to be 
accepted  
• Proposals for blockchain-based EHR systems, including: 
o MedRec 
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o BBDS 
o OmniPHR 
o MedShare 
1.5.3.1 Centralized-Based EHR 
The move towards Blockchain-based EHR systems to integrate distributed 
healthcare providers raises questions about the challenges of integrating current 
centralized EHR systems that are distributed among healthcare providers with existing 
legacy technology. Magyar [15] listed four challenges in integrating existing 
centralized EHR systems: 
• In centralized systems, EHRs are maintained in different formats that suit each 
provider’s business model. This requires various interfaces and protocols for 
integration, and there is no single protocol accepted across all providers. 
Because of this complexity, there is high potential of compromising the 
security of EHRs and the privacy of patients across the different utilized 
middleware technologies and protocols. 
• The current model of centralized systems provides high central authority to the 
dominant health provider of the patient, which complicates the exchange of 
health information in the case of unplanned treatment in an emergency 
situation and can cause serious results such as fatality because of the lack of 
timely access to EHRs.  
• Auditing patients’ history and traceability is a significant concern in centralized 
EHR systems as the information passes multiple healthcare providers. This is 
especially a concern when institutional incentives influence the history of a 
patient’s data  
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• The availability of patient data in integrated, centralized EHR systems is 
inconsistent, and the related regulations are unclear. It is subject to the 
resilience of each centralized healthcare provider. 
An example of integrating centralized EHR systems was a five-year agreement 
in 2016 between Google DeepMind and the Royal Free London NHS Foundation 
Trust. This integration encountered significant problems, which were summarized by 
Pilkington [16]: 
• Lack of transparency and privacy  
• Mismanagement of patients’ data and identities 
• Delayed treatment due to malicious software infections, which caused delayed 
service recovery 
1.5.3.2 Blockchain-Based EHR Required Capabilities  
Zhang, Walker, White, Schmidt, and Lenz [17] conducted research on the 
required metric for any blockchain-based EHR system to be accepted. The researchers 
identified seven metrics: 
1. Entire workflow of the system is HIPAA-compliant  
2. Framework supports Turing-complete operations 
3. Support for user identification and authentication 
4. Support for structural interoperability at minimum 
5. Scalability across large populations of healthcare participants 
6. Cost-effectiveness 
7. Support for patient-centered care model 
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1.5.3.2.1 Entire workflow of the system is HIPAA-compliant  
For a healthcare solution to be accepted and adopted, it must fulfill the 
regulatory requirements of a country’s National Health Authority (NHA). Considering 
the HIPAA Act, as an example of health regulation act in the US, Dagher, Mohler, 
Milojkovic, and Marella [18] analyzed its requirements and concluded that Title II of 
five HIPAA titles is relevant to Blockchain-based EHR. This title comprised the 
standards for privacy of individually identifiable health information (privacy rule) and 
the security standards for the protection of electronic protected health information 
(security rule). Magyar [15] further analyzed HIPAA requirements and concluded that 
Blockchain technology can fulfill the HIPAA requirements of secured access, privacy, 
lack of centralized government, and cost reduction.  
Zhang, Walker, White, Schmidt, and Lenz [17] highlighted precautions that 
should be considered when implementing HIPAA-complaint Blockchain-based 
solutions. Peng et al. stated, “A core tenet of HIPAA compliance is that Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII) must be protected against a confidentiality breach. In 
particular, the end-to-end workflow of a healthcare app from entering to processing 
then delivering the data must be HIPAA compliant”. This can be achieved in 
centralized systems using encryption techniques. However, in Blockchain, encryption 
may not be useful because any data stored in the Blockchain is replicated across all the 
miners and accessible by any party. Therefore, any breach of the currently used 
encryption algorithms makes the EHR information vulnerable, especially data in the 
Blockchain that is immutable and cannot be deleted. Accordingly, Zang et al. 
recommended storing encrypted metadata of the EHRs in the Blockchain (with a 
minimum level of information), which ensures that EHR data is securely stored [17].   
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1.5.3.2.2 Framework supports Turing-complete operations  
Zhang, Walker, White, Schmidt, and Lenz [17] stated that any Blockchain-
based EHR system should be Turing-complete and have programming capabilities to 
enable simple integration and interoperability with legacy systems. In addition, it 
should have the capability for simple upgrades and feature enhancements. Blockchain 
networks built specifically for healthcare applications are not scalable and cannot 
fulfill these requirements.  
1.5.3.2.3 Support for User Identification and Authentication 
In EHR systems, users are classified as patients and healthcare professionals. 
As [17] stated that any Blockchain-based EHR system should be able to uniquely 
identify and distinguish each user while maintaining their anonymity on the 
Blockchain, securely authenticate users, and be capable of recovering user’s 
authentication information if it is lost or stolen. 
1.5.3.2.4 Support for Structural Interoperability at Minimum 
The system should enable the exchange of medical data and interpretation of 
received data in its current standards [17], i.e., the system should be able to 
communicate with known industry standards such as FHIR and HL7.  
1.5.3.2.5 Scalability across Large Populations of Healthcare Participants 
This was described in [17] thus: “A successful health app should leverage the 
Blockchain to enhance interoperability, while maintaining its quality when users or 
components of the app scale up and out”. 
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1.5.3.2.6 Cost-effectiveness 
Any blockchain-based EHR system should be cost-effective compared to the 
existing legacy systems without affecting its capabilities [17]. This factor has a 
significant impact on the selection of blockchain parameters, including type, consensus 
algorithm and incentives model.   
1.5.3.2.7 Support of Patient-centered Care Model 
According to [17], any Blockchain-based EHR system should provide patients 
with the ability to control or monitor their information without compromising other 
functionalities. These features may include self-reporting health information, access 
to personal medical records and prescription history from different providers, auditing 
existing access to patient health records, and the ability to share or revoke access to 
patients’ own medical data. 
1.5.3.3 MedRec 
MedRec was proposed by Azaria, Ekblaw, Vieira, and Lippman [19] to utilize 
Blockchain technology to integrate existing centralized EHR systems among 
distributed healthcare providers. The solution uses Ethereum Blockchain’s smart 
contracts capability to facilitate this integration. Each healthcare provider should 
contribute an Ethereum mining node (usually a dedicated server) to participate in 
MedRec. In addition, patients should also contribute an Ethereum mining node (on a 
PC or mobile device) to participate in MedRec. The main functions of MedRec are to: 
• Enable inter-provider access to patients’ EHRs using API interfaces. The API 
information of the providers is stored in the Blockchain.  
• Provide patients with the capability to manage access control to their EHRs. 
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Access control lists for patients and providers are stored in the Blockchain. 
• Detect and notify patients about new access requests to their EHRs. Access 
can be granted or rejected only by patients.  
• Notify patients about changes to their EHRs and log the changes in the 
Blockchain. 
• Provide a copy of EHRs on patients’ nodes and dominant providers’ nodes. 
Although MedRec accelerates the deployment of EHR systems by integrating 
with existing systems using Blockchain technology to overcome the major limitations 
of centralized EHR systems, MedRec has shortcomings that limit its feasible 
production implementation:  
• A mandatory component of MedRec is the presence of patients’ nodes, which 
are used to communicate with patients for access control management. This 
limits the scope of MedRec solutions to Blockchain-enabled patients (i.e., 
patients should have an Ethereum account). This is a major limitation of the 
solution from the patients’ perspective (but not the providers’ perspective). 
Any proposed solution should be capable of supporting all patients without 
restrictions. 
• Ethereum Blockchain uses POW as its consensus algorithm, which is known 
to have significant computing power requirements. While healthcare providers 
can contribute powerful mining nodes to use MedRec, this cannot be 
(practically) achieved for patients, whose nodes are on PCs or mobile devices, 
making MedRec practically infeasible.  
• If a patient loses the private key to their Ethereum account (which is possible 
using a mobile device or PC), MedRec does not provide a mechanism for a 
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patient to recover control of their EHR.  
• The use of current centralized EHR systems raises an interoperability problem 
regarding inter-provider access. The solution must assume that all providers 
utilize the same EHR format standard such as HL7 or FHIR [19], which is not 
the case with the current centralized systems.  
• MedRec does not provide a mechanism for emergency access to EHRs if a 
patient is admitted to a non-authorized hospital for emergency treatment. 
1.5.3.4 BBDS 
Xia, Sifah, Smahi, Amofa, and Zhang [20] proposed a Blockchain-based data 
sharing (BBDS) system to provide access control management to EHRs stored in the 
cloud based on the Blockchain technology. The proposed BBDS system utilizes 
permissioned Blockchain consisting of an issuer that grants users or organizations 
access to the system, a verifier that validates requests from system members and grants 
corresponding access rights, and consensus nodes that facilitate the interface between 
members and the verifier in addition to logging requests in Blockchain for auditing 
and forensics purposes. The BBDS system provides the following functionalities: 
• A proof of verification (POV) algorithm between the issuer and 
users/organizations to enroll them in the BBDS system. The POV algorithm 
is based on a proposed lightweight Diffie-Helman key exchange to generate a 
session key for encryption and an electronic registration form to be validated 
by the issuer. 
• Controlled access to EHRs, stored in the cloud, by a verifier node for members 
of the BBDS system. This verification process is based on a per-member 
private key generated during the registration phase by the issuer and 
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communicated to members and the verifier. After successful verification of a 
member’s identity, the verifier validates the request against member rights 
and, if access is granted, the verifier retrieves data from the cloud and passes 
it to the member, or read data from the member and posts it in the cloud. 
• Audit logging in the Blockchain ledger using consensus nodes, where each 
member’s request to read or post an EHR is stored in a separate block. The 
information recorded in the block includes user identity, purpose of the 
request, processing consensus node, verification result, and timestamps, 
including request creation, request retrieval from unprocessed requests pool, 
verification time, block broadcast time, and data send time. 
Although the BBDS system is not limited by cryptography key recovery and 
emergency access restrictions (because the actual EHRs are not stored in the 
Blockchain and their access is controlled by the issuer/verifier), it has other limitations 
with the current implementation: 
• The use of permissioned Blockchain eliminates decentralized authority, which 
is a core advantage of Blockchain technology. The model provides central 
authority to the issuer (not the patient) to verify and accept members in the 
system.   
• Because of the use of non-Turing-complete Blockchain (i.e., no smart 
contracts), the BBDS system records each event in a single block to be able to 
uniquely identify the events by the block reference. This limits the scalability 
of the system because of recording a large number of blocks in a very short 
time.  
• The proposed model provides the data to the requester before recording the 
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request details in the Blockchain, which introduces a vulnerability in the 
system as data is provided without a recorded request. 
• The proposed BBDS system does not have a mechanism to detect 
modifications/tampering in EHRs in the cloud caused by system-independent 
reasons such as malicious activity in the cloud. 
1.5.3.5 MedShare 
MedShare was proposed by Yang et al. [21] to connect centralized healthcare 
entities and exchange EHRs using a hybrid cloud infrastructure. The proposal was 
prototyped with three healthcare entities: Hospital Conde S. Januário (HC), Kiang Wu 
Hospital (KW), and Macau University of Science and Technology Hospital (UH). 
Medshare functions as follows: 
• Each healthcare entity has a private cloud that converts EHRs from the entity’s 
specific format to a standard EHR format and stores them locally in the private 
cloud. In other words, each entity has two copies of an EHR, in a standard 
format and a non-standard format. 
• Standard format EHRs are indexed using hash maps, and the index values are 
stored in a public cloud that is connected with private clouds. The public cloud 
has a synchronizer component that is used to replicate per-patient EHRs across 
all private clouds (scheduled replication). 
• Doctors locally authenticate with the healthcare entity and query the EHRs of 
patients. If a healthcare entity cannot find a patient ID locally (assuming 
replication not yet been done), it queries the public cloud to locate the patient’s 
EHR and, after successful validation, obtains the EHR.   
The Medshare model is very practical and overcomes major limitations in 
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legacy EHR systems, but it lacks the following: 
• Neither private nor public clouds guarantee immutable access control rules, 
privacy isolation between patients, or immutable integrity verification, which 
is provided by Blockchain technology.  
• The replication of EHRs between healthcare entities is not scalable when a 
large number of healthcare entities are involved in the system. This requires !	 × (! − 1)	connections to achieve full replication of EHRs.  
• Medshare uses patients’ ID cards as a mechanism for uniquely identifying 
patients and obtaining their consent to grant healthcare providers access rights 
to their EHRs, which is known to be an insecure technique compared to 
biometrics identity verification. 
1.5.3.6 OmniPHR 
Roehrs, da Costa, and da Rosa Righi [22] proposed a Blockchain-based 
application, OmniPHR, to address the following problems: 
• Provide a unified view to patients of their healthcare records from anywhere 
at any time. 
• Provide up-to-date information to healthcare providers about patients 
regardless of whether the data is local to the provider or is from an external 
provider. 
• Provide a single standard for healthcare records. 
Each member of OmniPHR joins the Blockchain through a miner, called a leaf 
node. OmniPHR uses a ‘routing overlay’ node (called a super node), which is 
responsible for managing leaf nodes and inter-communication with other routing 
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overlays. Some other roles of the routing overlay node are:  
• EHR handling: Accepting input medical records from IoT devices or 
healthcare organizations, converting them to an open EHR format (the 
standard EHR format used by OmniPHR), dividing the EHRs into chunks of 
blocks, and distributing the blocks across Blockchain miners using load-
balancing algorithms 
• Security: Encrypting blocks, signing blocks, validating blocks, and providing 
access authentication and access control to the blocks.  
OmniPHR has limitations in its capability to provide a unified EHR system: 
• Similar to BBDS, the use of non-Turing-complete Blockchain adds significant 
complexity for additional features or enhancements to the system compared to 
Turing-complete Blockchain, which can have added features through software 
coding. 
• Storing large data in the Blockchain (e.g., X-rays and MRI scans) is not 
practical due to the size requirements on the nodes, which entails significant 
overhead in addition to the encryption and decryption processing overhead. 
• The proposed model does not uniquely identify the author of data because all 
the blocks are signed by the leaf nodes or super nodes.  
• Access to EHRs should be authorized by patients, which does not address the 
limitation of unplanned treatment such as emergency admission by 
unauthorized healthcare providers. 
• OmniPHR does not overcome the limitation of duplicate data such as duplicate 
patient registration information that occurs when a patient register at two 
healthcare providers with different identities. Ideally, OmniPHR should have 
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a mechanism to uniquely identify each patient without duplication, such as 
biometric identity.  
1.5.3.7 MedBlock 
Fan, Wang, Ren, Li, and Yang [23] proposed the MedBlock system to share 
medical data efficiently using Blockchain. The MedBlock system generates a 
private/public key pair for each patient that is used to encrypt and sign medical records. 
The actual records are stored in the health provider’s local database while the 
Blockchain holds the hash value of the records. The core functions provided by 
MedBlock are: 
• A dedicated certificate authority server is used to generate keypairs for 
patients, community hospitals and national hospitals.  
• Patients submit their records through community hospitals or national 
hospitals signed with their private key and encrypted by their public 
key. 
• Health records are not stored in community hospitals. Instead, they are 
stored directly in national hospitals’ databases. 
• The department that accepted records from a patient signs them using 
its local private key to ensure integrity and non-repudiation. 
• Each geo-group of national hospitals has the same group of endorsers 
that will build the blocks and submit them to the consensus nodes 
(called orderers).  The hospitals submit the hash value of the medical 
records to the endorsers, and the records are stored in the local database. 
• Once the orderers reach consensus, they post the block to the ledger. 
• Access control is implemented by MedBlock through private key 
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signatures. The client application scans the blocks until a valid 
signature is found that corresponds to the patient’s data.  
While MedBlock provides an efficient and scalable mechanism using role-
based nodes to perform specific functions and guarantee security through double-
signing, it has the following drawbacks: 
• The use of private/public keys for patients to sign and encrypt records 
creates an issue in the case of unplanned treatment such as emergency 
admission. In such a case, medical records will not be accessible, which 
can cause complications with treatment and even fatality.  
• If a private key is lost, patients cannot recover their medical records.  
• The access control mechanism used is inefficient, especially when the 
ledger grows to a very large number of blocks. In this case, examining 
all the blocks until the records are found is not scalable.  
• The lack of programmability is a major drawback of MedBlock if new 
features are required, as this would require the addition of new nodes.  
• MedBlock does not provide a mechanism to exchange medical records 
between hospitals as the records are stored in the local database of 
national hospitals.   
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Chapter 2: Methods 
 
This chapter addresses the contribution to the problem statement and proposes 
a solution to ensure an access recovery mechanism for patients’ EHRs that are 
exchanged and synchronized between distributed healthcare providers using 
Blockchain. The high-level architecture of the solution is discussed, followed by a 
detailed explanation of individual components and layers.  In addition, functional use 
cases of the design are provided and explained.   
2.1 Design Overview 
The approach followed in our solution is to divide the system into layers and 
provide distributed functions in a modular structure. Accordingly, the system is 
divided into four layers, namely the User Interface, Middleware, Blockchain, and 
Cloud Store. Figure 6 shows the layers that comprise SDHCARE and the modules 
associated with each layer. 
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Figure 6: SDHCARE High-Level Architecture 
 
2.1.1 User Interface (UI) Layer 
The UI layer is the presentation of the system to the users, by which they can 
interact with SDHCARE. These users can be doctors, pharmacists, receptionists, 
Admin UI
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Patient UI
External Entity UI
DirectoryService
DatabaseService
Blockchain Client
ehrHashTable
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patientsSC Cloud Store
Cloud API Interface
patientsTable
(a) - User Interface
(b) - Middleware
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Doctor UI
accessControlSC
(d) - Cloud
Layers Local Per-Provider
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officers, researchers, or insurance companies, among others. This layer is local to each 
healthcare provider that is a member of SDHCARE. It has mandatory and customized 
components according to a provider’s needs. The mandatory components are 
summarized as: 
• Admin UI: This interface is mainly used by authorized representatives 
of the healthcare provider to enroll the provider in the SDHCARE 
system.  Upon successful enrollment, the provider’s details are stored 
in a providers’ immutable table for it to be uniquely identified in the 
SDHCARE system.  
• Reception UI: This interface is used by a healthcare provider’s 
reception department. It provides two main functions: 
o Registering new patients in the system, which involves creating 
an entry for each patient in an immutable-blockchain table that 
includes all patients in SDHCARE.  This ensures exchange and 
synchronization of all patients across SDHCARE healthcare 
providers. 
o Booking and confirming patients’ appointments, which grant 
the corresponding clinics and/or departments access to patient’s 
records (after the patient’s confirmation using his/her 
fingerprints). This access is stored and maintained along with 
the patient’s registration record. 
• Patient UI: This is a biometric interface that accepts patients’ 
fingerprints and uses them for the following functions: 
o Uniquely identify patients using fingerprints instead of secret 
keys (or private keys) across all members of SDHCARE. 
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o Managing access and role assignments by patients using 
fingerprints, which eliminates the problem of recovering a 
patient’s management of access to their records in the case of a 
lost secret key 
o Indexing patients’ records metadata stored in the blockchain 
records table 
o Simplify the process of granting access to patient records in the 
case of emergency treatment using fingerprints   
• Doctor UI: This interface is used by the doctors to view patients’ EHRs 
and post new EHRs after successful validation of a patient’s identity 
and authorization rules implemented in the SDHCARE system.  
• External Entity UI: This interface enables remote healthcare providers, 
research entities, insurance companies, and other parties to obtain 
access to patient records after successful validation of access requests 
to provide globalized access to the SDHCARE system. 
2.1.2 Middleware Layer 
This layer is the core of the SDHCARE solution. It is used to interlink all of 
the other SDHCARE layers in addition to providing major SDHCARE services, 
including directory services and database services. Figure 6 (b) lists all modules 
included in the Middleware layer. These modules are local to each healthcare provider 
participating in the SDHCARE system and can be summarized as follows: 
• DirectoryService Module: This module is mainly used to host the 
directory of all accounts of the healthcare provider. Local identities 
within the healthcare provider (e.g., doctors, nurses, system admins, 
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receptionists) are validated against the DirectoryService module. 
Additionally, it is responsible for access control validation on UIs. 
• DatabaseService Module: This module is responsible for holding all 
database information local to the healthcare provider, including clinics’ 
IDs, provider registration details, and patients’ appointments.  
• Middleware Manager Module: This module acts as the main controller 
for interacting between the modules within Middleware layer as well 
as intercommunication with other layers including UI, Blockchain and 
Cloud Store layers.  
• Cloud Application Programmable Interface (API) Interface Module: 
This module is mainly used to facilitate communication between the 
Middleware Manager module and the Cloud Store to read or post 
healthcare records. 
• Blockchain Client Module: This module is responsible for the 
communication between the healthcare providers and Blockchain layer. 
All interactions between the Middleware Manager module and the 
Blockchain layer go through this module. Two types of operations exist 
within this module: 
o Write requests to publish new blockchain transactions of data 
to the Blockchain smart contracts and immutable tables. 
o Read requests in the form of data transactions consolidated in 
blocks to read data from the immutable tables or responses from 
smart contracts. 
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2.1.3 Blockchain Layer 
The Blockchain layer is a shared layer across all healthcare providers 
participating in SDHCARE. This layer provides two core functions in the SDHCARE 
system, namely:  
• Immutable smart contracts (SC) to perform programmed logic 
functions. 
• Immutable tables in the form of chained blocks to store different types 
of data that need to be protected against unauthorized tampering.  
The design of the immutable tables is distributed to ensure the anonymity of 
the data stored in these tables. For example, the visibility of ehrHashTable should not 
provide any correlation to the patients in patientsTable. This correlation is controlled 
by the middleware layer using patient’s fingerprint hash. Similarly, the design of the 
smart contracts is distributed to ensure modularity and flexibility for additional 
features and enhancements.  
Figure 6 (c) summarizes the components of the Blockchain layer. The next 
sections provide details of each component. 
2.1.3.1 DNS Smart Contract (dnsSC) 
The dnsSC is programmed to perform the initial enrollment of the healthcare 
provider in the SDHCARE system. It takes the provider’s information from the Admin 
UI and stores it in providersTable. In addition, it ensures the uniqueness of the 
provider’s information across all the members of the SDHCARE system. 
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2.1.3.2 Patients Smart Contract (patientsSC) 
This smart contract plays a vital role in the SDHCARE system and is 
responsible for multiple functions: 
• Initial registration of patients in the SDHCARE system, which includes 
populating patients’ details in patientsTable.  
• Updating ehrHashTable with new EHR metadata and their 
corresponding hash values. 
• Retrieving patients’ details from patientsTable. 
• Retrieving the list of EHRs from ehrHashTable. 
2.1.3.3 Providers Table (providersTable) 
providersTable is an immutable table stored in Blockchain (in the form of 
chained blocks) and holds information about all healthcare providers that are members 
of SDHCARE. It is populated using dnsSC. Figure 7 outlines the information held in 
providersTable: 
• Name: Healthcare provider’s name 
• Web address: Healthcare provider’s domain name 
• OHP: Healthcare provider’s Blockchain address 
 
Figure 7: Summary of providersTable Data 
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2.1.3.4 Patients Table (patientsTable) 
This immutable table stores information about patients and is populated using 
patientsSC. The data in patientsTable is indexed using patients’ fingerprints hashes, 
which is critical for the unique identification of patients. In addition, the fingerprints 
hashes indicate the relationship between patientsTable and ehrHashTable. Figure 8 
summarizes the data stored in this table: 
• Fingerprint Hash: Patient fingerprint hash 
• OHP: This is used to trace the origin of the patient record 
• PACL: This is the patient access control list array and includes the IDs 
of clinics allowed to access a patient’s EHR 
• Receptionist ID: The ID of a local’s provider reception department is 
used for auditing purposes 
 
Figure 8: Summary of patientsTable Data 
 
2.1.3.5 EHR Metadata Table (ehrHashTable) 
The EHR Metadata Table holds the metadata of patients’ EHRs and their 
corresponding hash values. These hash values are used for indexing EHR raw data 
uploaded to the cloud store. Additionally, these hash values are used for detecting any 
unauthorized changes to EHRs. Similar to patientsTable, ehrHashTable is indexed 
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using patients’ fingerprints hashes to ensure unique mapping between patients’ EHRs 
and their identities.  
Our design stores the hash values of the EHRs in ehrHashTable instead of the 
EHRs raw data for two reasons: 
• In Blockchain, blocks are not encrypted, accordingly, storing clear-text 
EHRs breaches the privacy of patients. Further, storing encrypted 
EHRs makes them subject to crypto-analytic attacks, and any success 
in cracking the encrypted algorithms would breach patients’ privacy. 
• Blocks are stored locally on the miners. This method can be used for 
small EHRs. However, for large EHRs such as MRI scans and X-ray 
images, the solution won’t be scalable.  
Figure 9 summarizes the information included in ehrHashTable: 
• EHR Name: EHR name 
• EHR Date: EHR creation date 
• EHR Hash: EHR Merkle root hash  
• Fingerprint Hash: Patient fingerprint hash 
• EHR Status: EHR status (active/deleted) 
 
Figure 9: Summary of ehrHashTable Data 
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The hash value of the EHR is calculated using a Merkle Tree algorithm as 
follow: 
H1 = SHA256 (EHR Name) + SHA256 (EHR Raw Data)  
H2 = SHA256 (Date) + SHA256 (EHR Status) 
Merkle Root Hash = SHA256(SHA256 (H1) + SHA256 (H2)) 
Finally, the Merkle root hash is used as an indexing key in the cloud store to 
look up EHRs raw data.  
2.1.3.6 Access Control Smart Contract (accessControlSC) 
The accessControlSC acts as access control manager for any activity on 
patients’ EHRs. It validates all requests including: 
• Writing EHR records in ehrHashTable. 
• Reading EHR records from ehrHashTable. 
• Granting health provider clinics access to EHRs. 
Table 4 summarizes the access control matrix provided by accessControlSC. 
 
Table 4: Access Control Matrix by accessControlSC 
 providersTable patientsTable ehrHashTable 
Reception   Read 
Write 
 
Doctor  Read Read 
Write 
Patient  Grant Grant 
Officer Read/Write   
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2.1.4 Cloud Store Layer 
The Cloud Store layer is a shared layer across all healthcare providers 
participating in the SDHCARE system. It holds patients’ raw EHRs, which are indexed 
using Merkle root hash values of the EHRs. This makes EHRs in the cloud store 
completely anonymous. In other words, an EHR cannot be traced back to a patient’s 
identity because patient’s identity, fingerprint, is not stored in the cloud store, 
blockchain or providers’ DatabaseService modules.   
2.2 Functional Use Cases  
This section explains SDHCARE operation for major use cases that exist in 
any healthcare provider deploying SDHCARE. These use cases include provider 
enrollment in SDHCARE, new patient registration, patient appointment management, 
and doctors’ access to patients’ EHRs. 
2.2.1 SDHCARE Provider Enrollment 
For enrollment in the SDHCARE system, a provider should select a unique 
name and web address for global reachability.  The next step is storing this information 
in providersTable. This helps other providers verify the uniqueness of their 
information before enrollment in SDHCARE. Further, it is used by all SDHCARE 
healthcare providers to identify the source of patient EHRs. The process of provider 
enrollment, shown in Figure 10, is summarized as follow:  
1. From the Admin UI, the provider’s admin is authenticated against the 
provider’s DirectoryService.  
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2. After successful authentication, the admin enters the provider’s details 
in the Admin UI (name and web address).  
3. The provider’s Middleware Manager sends a request to the Blockchain 
through its Blockchain Client to create a new account, which entails 
generating a keypair. The private key is used to sign all requests 
(transactions) from the provider. The public key is used as the 
provider’s Blockchain address to uniquely identify it across the ledger 
(OHP). This keypair is returned to the provider from the Blockchain 
and stored in DatabaseService component of SDHCARE 
4. Next, the Middleware Manager obtains the provider’s OHP from the 
DatabaseService component and the Blockchain Client calls the dnsSC 
to update providersTable with the provider’s name, web address, and 
OHP. 
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Figure 10: Hospital Enrollment Sequence Diagram 
 
2.2.2 Patient Registration 
New patients visiting a SDHCARE-enabled healthcare provider go through the 
registration process to be added to patientsTable. Once patients complete the 
registration process, they are uniquely identified across all SDHCARE-enabled 
providers. This unique identification is achieved using patients’ fingerprints hashes for 
patientsTable indexing. The process of adding new patients to the SDHCARE system 
is described below and summarized in Figure 11.  
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1. The receptionist uses Reception UI to authenticate against a provider’s 
DirectoryService.  
2. After successful authentication, the receptionist captures the patient’s 
details that are required by patientsTable through Reception UI. 
3. The patient validates and confirms the details by submitting his/her 
fingerprint through Patient UI. A fingerprint is a mandatory input to resume 
the process. 
4. Next, the provider’s Middleware Manager obtains the provider’s OHP and 
the reception ID from the provider’s DatabaseService. This information is 
passed to the Blockchain Client.  
5. Finally, the provider’s Blockchain Client calls patientsSC to store the 
patient’s details entered by the receptionist, along with the provider’s OHP 
and reception ID, in patientsTable indexed using the patient’s fingerprint 
hash.  
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Figure 11: Summary of the Patient Registration Process 
 
2.2.3 Patient Appointment Management 
SDHCARE-reception manages patients’ appointments, including booking new 
appointments and acknowledging existing appointments attended by patients. The 
appointments are stored in each provider’s DatabaseService and are indexed using 
patients’ national IDs (NIDs). Additionally, the appointments are not synchronized 
between providers in the SDHCARE system. A patient attending an appointment needs 
to confirm the attendance by submitting his/her fingerprint. This confirmation grants 
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the clinic access to the patient’s EHR. Figure 12 summarizes the process of booking a 
new patient appointment, which entails the following steps: 
1. The receptionist uses Reception UI to authenticate against the provider’s 
DirectoryService.  
2. After successful authentication, the receptionist provides appointment 
details, including the patient’s name, NID, date/time, and clinic.  
3. The Middleware Manager receives the details of the appointment from the 
Reception UI and stores them in the DatabaseService of the local provider. 
 
 
Figure 12: Process for Booking a New Appointment  
 
The process of confirming a patient’s appointment and granting access to the 
visited clinic is described below and summarized in Figure 13: 
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1. The receptionist uses Reception UI to authenticate against the provider’s 
DirectoryService.  
2. After successful authentication, the receptionist looks up the patient’s NID 
against DatabaseService to obtain a list of the patient’s active 
appointments. 
3. The receptionist selects the desired appointment and the patient confirms it 
by submitting his/her fingerprint using Patient UI. 
4. Upon confirmation, the Middleware Manager queries DatabaseService to 
obtain the visited clinic’s ID and deactivate the selected appointment. 
5. Finally, the Middleware Manager calls accessControlSC through the 
Blockchain Client to append the clinic’s ID to the PACL stored in 
patientsTable and indexed using the patient’s fingerprint hash. This grants 
the visited clinic access to the patient’s EHR.  
It is important to note that the Blockchain Client uses the clinic ID + OHP as 
the format of the clinic ID stored in PACL. This eliminates the possibility of conflict 
caused by providers having the same clinic IDs and being granted access to the same 
EHRs. For example, if the clinic ID is 100 and the OHP is 100000000000000000001, 
the clinic ID stored in PACL is 100100000000000000000001, which is guaranteed to 
be unique due to the uniqueness of the OHP in the Blockchain. 
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Figure 13: Booking Confirmation and Access Granting Summary 
 
2.2.4 Doctor’s EHR Access  
In the SDHCARE system, doctors can have read and/or write access to EHRs, 
as detailed in Section 2.1.3.6. This access can be granted by patients using their 
fingerprints, as described in Section 2.2.3. EHRs are divided into EHRs’ metadata, 
which is stored in ehrHashTable and indexed using patients’ fingerprints hashes to 
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ensure unique identification, and EHRs’ raw data, which is stored in the cloud store 
and indexed using the Merkle root hash of the EHRs.  Using read access, doctors can 
obtain a list of accessible patients’ EHRs from ehrHashTable and download the desired 
one(s) from the cloud store. Write access allows doctors to create new EHR metadata 
in ehrHashTable and upload the EHR raw data to the cloud store. The following 
summarizes doctors’ EHR read process, which is also outlined in Figure 14.  
1. The doctor uses Doctor UI to authenticate against the provider’s 
DirectoryService.  
2. After successful authentication, Doctor UI is redirected to Patient UI for 
the patient to submit their fingerprint. 
3. Upon the patient’s submission of their fingerprint, the Middleware 
Manager queries the DatabaseService for the doctor’s clinic ID using the 
doctor’s username. 
4. Next, the Middleware Manager makes a call to accessControlSC through 
the Blockchain Client. This call uses the patient’s fingerprint hash and the 
doctor’s clinic ID to validate whether the doctor has read access to the 
patient’s EHR. 
5. If the clinic ID is listed in the PACL of the patient (by reading patientsTable 
using the fingerprint hash), accessControlSC grants the doctor read access.  
6. Based on the authorized read request, the Blockchain Client calls 
patientsSC to find the list of EHRs stored in ehrHashTable. This list is 
returned to the Middleware Manager which passes the details to Doctor UI. 
The lookup is executed by patientsSC using the patient’s fingerprint hash 
passed from the Blockchain Client. 
57 
 
 
 
 
7. Upon the doctor’s selection of the desired record, the Middleware Manager 
initiates a call to the cloud store, through Cloud API Interface, to retrieve 
the EHR data (using the Merkle root hash associated with the selected 
record in the list). 
8. Once the EHR data is received by the Middleware Manager, it performs an 
integrity check by comparing the stored Merkle hash of the selected record 
against the calculated Merkle hash of the received data.  
9. If the hash is valid, the Middleware Manager passes the data back to the 
doctor. Otherwise, an integrity failure alert is triggered. 
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Figure 14: Summary of the EHR Read Process 
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Similar to the read process for EHRs, the process by which doctors write EHRs 
by doctors is outlined in Figure 15 and summarized as follows: 
1. The doctor uses Doctor UI to authenticate against the provider’s 
DirectoryService. 
2. After successful authentication, the doctor adds details and/or attach files to the 
EHR. 
3. The patient verifies the details of the EHR and confirms acceptance by 
submitting their fingerprint.  
4. Once submitted, the Middleware Manager looks for the doctor’s clinic ID in 
DatabaseService using the doctor’s login. 
5. Once the clinic ID is returned from DatabaseService, the Middleware Manager 
uses the Blockchain Client to call accessControlSC requesting authorization to 
write EHR metadata to ehrHashTable. The authorization request submits the 
patient’s fingerprint hash and clinic ID to accessControlSC to verify if the 
clinic ID is listed in the PACL of the patient. 
6. Upon successful authorization, the Middleware Manager calculates the Merkle 
root hash of the EHR. 
7. Next, the Blockchain Client call patientsSC to write EHR metadata into 
ehrHashTable, which includes EHR details and the Merkle root hash. This is 
indexed using the patient’s fingerprint hash. 
8. Finally, the Middleware Manager uses the Cloud API Interface to upload the 
EHR data to the cloud store with the name of the EHR as the Merkle root hash. 
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Figure 15: Summary of the EHR Write Process 
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Chapter 3: Implementation 
 
This chapter discusses the implementation of the SDHCARE prototype 
according to the proposed design functions. The chapter covers the selection process 
for the technologies used in the prototype and provides an overview of them. The final 
section of this chapter outlines the high-level implementation of the SDHCARE 
prototype. The low-level implementation and coding of the SDHCARE prototype are 
described in detail in the appendices. 
3.1 Prototype Components 
This section provides an overview of the components used to build our 
prototype. These components were selected based on the following criteria:  
• Simplicity of the component setup and configuration to implement the 
required functions in SDHCARE.  
• Interoperability capabilities of the component with other technologies 
to simulate the overall design of SDHCARE. 
• Feature richness and built-in security capabilities of the component that 
are in line with SDHCARE requirements. 
• Stability, reliability, and operational consistency of the component. 
 
According to the proposed SDHCARE design, which was described in Chapter 
2, the following technologies were selected for the prototype: 
• Django 3.0 Web Development Platform: This was used to build the 
required web interfaces for Doctor UI, Admin UI, and Reception UI.  
Django is a Python-based platform that has built-in directory services. 
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This feature allows Django to integrate seamlessly with customized 
Python modules to provide additional functions such as API integration 
with Ethereum. 
• Python 3.8: The Python interpreter is at the core of the SDHCARE 
prototype and provides the following functions: 
o Django web development coding language.  
o Interaction with Django built-in directory services. 
o API integration with the Blockchain and cloud store. 
o SQL interface with healthcare provider database. 
o Integrity validation and hashing of EHRs.  
• SQLite 3: SQLite was used to implement the DatabaseService module 
local to the healthcare provider, mainly for storing information, 
including departments’ IDs, appointments, and a provider’s Blockchain 
details. SQLite has a native database connector with Django through 
Python. 
• Ethereum Blockchain: This is the public Blockchain technology used 
to provide immutable smart contracts and immutable tables. Ethereum 
was chosen to extend the accessibility to EHRs at large scale, including 
cases in which patients relocate to different geographic areas. In such 
cases, the new geo-healthcare provider can connect to Ethereum and 
request access to a patient’s EHR. 
• Microsoft (MS) Azure Files: This service is hosted on the public cloud 
to store EHRs. The selection of MS Azure Files was due to its simple 
accessibility and usability in addition to its independence from the 
format of EHRs. MS Azure Files uses an SMB protocol to provide 
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secure communication between on-premise infrastructure and the cloud 
[24]. 
3.2 Django Architecture  
This section covers the basics of Django web development architecture to 
enable an understanding of the setup and configuration of the SDHCARE prototype. 
Django consists of frontend and backend layers. The frontend layer consists of HTML 
templates with which clients interact. The backend layer, on the other hand, gets inputs 
from templates and performs the programmed function accordingly. Figure 16 shows 
a block diagram of Django architecture.  
 
Figure 16: Django Web Development Architecture 
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Django simplifies HTML coding using Forms, which are Python functions 
defined in forms.py file. These functions specify HTML input fields and their labels, 
types, and maximum lengths, etc. (Forms do not include HTML styles and javascripts). 
The actual HTML pages presented to clients are combined versions of style sheets, 
javascripts, bootstraps, and other elements defined in HTML template files and with 
inputs returned from forms.py. 
The input values returned from the clients can be written into the database 
through Models (models.py). Models act as an abstraction layer, provided by Django 
and programmed using Python. They can translate Python instructions into database 
queries depending on the type of integrated database. Models can receive input values 
from HTML templates through Views (views.py).  Additionally, Models can poll data 
from the database and pre-fill Forms inputs to be presented to clients through HTML 
templates (such as by dropdown selection).  
Tables (tables.py) in Django are used to populate information from the 
database in table format and present them to clients. This simplifies the process of 
creating HTML tables compared to traditional HTML methods. Tables do not handle 
styles, as this is controlled through HTML templates.  
Django uses Views to link Forms, Tables, and Models with Templates. Views 
control the logic of the Django web flow and how requests/responses are handled 
between clients and the web application. It is at this point that SDHCARE core 
functions are implemented. Additionally, Views allow the import of custom Python 
models for extended functionalities that are not present in Django.  
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3.3 System Implementation 
This section outlines the implementation steps of the SDHCARE prototype 
and covers high-level implementation. The source code for Django, Python modules, 
and Ethereum smart contracts is included in the appendices.  
3.3.1 Building the Runtime Environment  
The first step in building the SDHCARE prototype was setting up the runtime 
environment that hosts the prototype components (described in Section 3.1). These 
components are independent of operating-system. MacOS Catalina was selected as the 
OS hosting SDHCARE system in the healthcare provider to run Django, Python, and 
SQLite, and communicate with Ethereum and MS Azure. Figure 17 shows the used 
version of MacOS.  
 
Figure 17: MacOS Software Version for SDHCARE 
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The next step was to download and install Python 3.8 and PyCharm 2019.3.2 
IDE. From PyCharm IDE, a new virtual environment was created to use Python 3.8 as 
an interpreter for Django and custom Python modules.  This was followed by creating 
a new project in PyCharm called SDHCARE to run on the created virtual environment, 
i.e., interpreted using Python 3.8 as shown in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18: PyCharm SDHCARE Project with Python 3.8 Interpreter 
 
Following the creation of the SDHCARE project in PyCharm, a list of 
required Python libraries was installed. Table 5 summarizes this list of libraries. 
Python uses the PIP3 utility to install external libraries from the internet. 
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Table 5: Python Libraries Required for SDHCARE 
Library Name Purpose 
django Web development framework; this installation includes 
SQLite 3 
django-Tables2 For formatting and styling tables in Django 
crispy For formatting and styling HTML templates in Django 
web3 For API communication with Ethereum 
azure-storage-file For API communication with MS Azure 
 
3.3.2 Initializing SDHCARE Web and Database Components  
After preparing the runtime environment for hosting SDHCARE, the next step 
was initializing the Django web framework and database. The initialization was done 
in the following order to ensure the successful running of Django:  
1. Initialize SQLite3 DB to be ready for storing the provider’s Ethereum 
information and clinics’ information. This is done by running the following 
commands from the PyCharm SDHCARE project terminal: 
python manage.py makemigrations 
python manage.py migrate 
2. Create a Django admin user to administrate the Django management console, 
including account creation in the Django built-in directory service. These 
accounts represent doctors, nurses, officers, and receptionists. Additionally, the 
admin user populates the SQLite3 database with information about the 
healthcare provider’s clinics and Ethereum information. The command for 
creating an admin user is: 
68 
 
 
 
 
python manage.py createsuperuser 
3. Create SDHCARE user accounts and groups by navigating to 
http://localhost:8000/admin, signing in using the admin account, adding groups 
for different permissions, adding new users, and assigning users to their 
respective groups. Figure 19 shows a sample of users, groups, and their 
assignments.  
 
Figure 19: Example of Users, Groups, and Group Assignment 
4. Create local database tables for the SDHCARE healthcare provider. These 
tables are stored in the SQLite3 database with the following structures: 
69 
 
 
 
 
• Appointments Table: Name Column (patient name), NID, Date 
Column, Time Column, and Department Column (clinic to be visited). 
• Departments Table: Code Column (clinic code) and Name Column 
(clinic name). 
• Provider Table: OHP Column (Ethereum public key) and Secret 
Column (Ethereum private key). 
The Python code for creating these tables was written in models.py as shown 
below. 
class department(models.Model): 
    code = models.IntegerField(unique=True, primary_key=True) 
    name = models.CharField(max_length=100) 
 
class provider(models.Model): 
    ohp = models.CharField(max_length=100, primary_key=True) 
    secret = models.CharField(max_length=100) 
 
class appointment(models.Model): 
    name = models.CharField(max_length=100) 
    nid = models.IntegerField() 
    date = models.DateField(default=timezone.now) 
    time = models.TimeField(default=timezone.now) 
    department_code = models.ForeignKey('department', 
on_delete=models.CASCADE) 
 
 
5. From the Django admin console, populate departments and provider database 
tables with provider’s clinics’ details and Ethereum details, respectively 
(appointments database is populated by the receptionist, as described later). 
Figure 20 shows the created tables from the Django admin console.  
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Figure 20: Example of SDHCARE Databases 
 
3.3.3 Building SDHCARE Django Code 
After the successful initialization of Django, the next step was writing the 
Django Python code to perform the required functions of the SDHCARE prototype. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this section covers only the high-level 
coding structure. The low-level coding is available in the appendices. 
The first step in Django coding was developing the HTML templates for the 
frontend layer. The approach for HTML coding was based on developing a base 
template (base.html) containing all shared components across all pages, such as 
header, footer, title, and styles. Any child HTML template has page-specific 
components combined with the base template, presented to the user. Figure 21 
summarizes the HTML coding approach along with all the HTML templates.  
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Figure 21: Summary of HTML SDHCARE Template Structure 
 
As summarized in Figure 21, each UI has a set of specific HTML templates 
that are combined with base.html before being presented to the user.  
After creating the HTML templates, the next step was building the functions 
in forms.py (for the input fields to be presented with each template) and associating 
each form’s function with its corresponding HTML template through functions in 
views.py. Figures 22, 23, and 24 provide summaries of forms.py, views.py, and the 
corresponding UI.  
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Figure 22: Admin UI with Forms and Views 
 
 
Figure 23: Doctor UI with Forms and View
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Figure 24: Reception UI with Forms and Views 
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Below is a sample of code in views.py, which links adminui-get.html with the 
getProviderInfo function from forms.py. The page should display one field to the user 
to enter ‘Hospital Ethereum Address’ as shown in Figure 25.  
views.py 
************************************************************ 
 
def adminui_get(request): 
    # if this is a POST request we need to process the form data 
    if request.method == 'POST': 
        # create a form instance and populate it with data from the 
request: 
        form = getProviderInfo(request.POST) 
        # check whether it is valid: 
        if form.is_valid(): 
            account_address = form.cleaned_data.get('OHP_Eth') 
            provider = dnsSC_get(account_address) 
            context = { 
                'provider': provider 
            } 
 
            return render(request, 'SDHCARE/adminui-get.html', context) 
 
    # if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form 
    else: 
        form = getProviderInfo() 
 
 
forms.py 
************************************************************ 
 
class getProviderInfo(forms.Form): 
    OHP_Eth = forms.CharField(label='Hospital Ethereum Address', 
max_length=100) 
 
 
Figure 25: Healthcare Provider’s getProviderInfo Page 
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Access to each set of UIs is controlled using role-based access control (RBAC) 
implemented by Python decorators. The decorator obtains the session username, 
verifies its group membership (which was configured during Django initialization), 
and allows access only if the user is a member of the required group. Below is a sample 
code of using decorators to limit doctors’ access to Doctors UI only. These decorators 
are implemented in views.py. 
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='SDHCARE-Admins') 
in u.groups.all()) 
def adminui(request): 
 
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='SDHCARE-Admins') 
in u.groups.all()) 
def adminui_get(request): 
 
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='SDHCARE-Admins') 
in u.groups.all()) 
def adminui_submit(request): 
 
Another access control mechanism is applied to grant permissions to access 
patients’ EHRs, using decorators and smart contracts. Clinics are granted permissions 
to access patients’ EHRs only if the session user is a member of the SDHCARE-
Reception group and the patient submits a valid fingerprint. A third form of access 
control is applied for doctors’ access to EHRs and is covered in Section 3.3.4.  
The last step in Django coding was linking models to UIs through views. In 
Figures 22, 23, and 24 the set of functions in models.py are mapped to their respective 
UIs to have information read from the database and displayed to clients, such as a 
patient’s appointments or a provider’s OHP address, or to write information such as 
booking a new appointment into the database. Some database information, such as 
appointments, is formatted in tables, hence the information from models.py is passed 
to views.py through tables.py. Below is a sample code for formatting appointment 
data.  
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tables.py 
************************************************************ 
 
class appointmentTable(tables.Table): 
    department_code = tables.Column(verbose_name='Clinic') 
    #nid = tables.Column(verbose_name='National ID') 
    # id = tables.Column(visible=False) 
    id = tables.CheckBoxColumn(accessor='id') 
 
    class Meta: 
        model = appointment 
        template_name = "django_tables2/bootstrap4.html" 
 
models.py 
************************************************************ 
 
class appointment(models.Model): 
    name = models.CharField(max_length=100) 
    nid = models.IntegerField() 
    date = models.DateField(default=timezone.now) 
    time = models.TimeField(default=timezone.now) 
    department_code = models.ForeignKey('department', 
on_delete=models.CASCADE) 
 
    def __str__(self): 
        return self.name 
 
views.py 
************************************************************ 
 
def receptionui_get(request): 
    # if this is a POST request we need to process the form data 
    if request.method == 'POST': 
        # create a form instance and populate it with data from the 
request: 
        form = getAppointments(request.POST) 
        # check whether it is valid: 
        if form.is_valid(): 
            nid = form.cleaned_data.get('nid') 
            table = appointmentTable(appointment.objects.filter(nid=nid)) 
            return render(request, 'SDHCARE/receptionui-get.html', 
{"table": table}) 
 
    else: 
        form = getAppointments() 
 
    return render(request, 'SDHCARE/receptionui-get.html', {'form': form}) 
 
The following set of tables (Tables 6, 7, and 8) summarize the functions 
configured in Views, Forms, and Tables. These functions describe how SDHCARE 
design requirements are implemented in Django. The functions in Models were 
described in the previous section that outlines Django SQLite3 DB initialization.  
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Table 6: Summary of Views Functions 
Name Description 
home To render home page template to users 
about To render about page template to users 
adminui 
• Verifies that the session user is a member of the 
SDHCARE-Admins group 
• Renders the base and adminui templates for admins 
to select ‘Enter Hospital Information’ or ‘Get 
Hospital Information’ 
adminui_get 
• Verifies that a session user is a member of the 
SDHCARE-Admins group 
• Reads admin OHP input and obtains the hospital 
information stored in Ethereum providersTable for 
that OHP; this information is returned to the admin 
adminui_submit 
• Verifies that the session user is a member of the 
SDHCARE-Admins group 
• Reads admin input (hospital name and web 
address) and stores the information in Ethereum 
providersTable using OHP as the indexing key; 
OHP is obtained from the address of the transaction 
sender 
receptionui 
• Verifies that the session user is a member of the 
SDHCARE-Reception group 
• Renders the base and receptionui templates for 
reception to select ‘New Patient’, ‘Get Patient 
Appointments’, or ‘Book New Appointment’ 
receptionui_get 
• Verifies that the session user is a member of the 
SDHCARE-Reception group 
• Accepts a patient’s fingerprints and uses it as an 
index key to obtain all active appointments 
associated with that patient  
appointment_confirm 
Performs two-factor validation by verifying a patient’s 
fingerprint and reception group membership; if both are 
valid, the clinic is granted access to the patient’s EHRs; 
this access is stored in the Ethereum patientsTable and 
covers all doctors in that clinic 
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Table 6: Summary of Views Functions (Continued) 
Name Description 
receptionui_book 
• Verifies that the session user is a member of the 
SDHCARE-Reception group 
• Books new appointments for patients and stores 
them in the appointments database, which is 
indexed using the patient’s NID  
new_patient 
• Verifies that the session user is a member of the 
SDHCARE-Reception group 
• Creates a new patient record in the Ethereum 
patientsTable 
doctorui 
• Verifies that the session user is a member of the 
SDHCARE-Doctor group 
• Renders the base and doctorui templates for the 
doctor to select ‘Get Patient EHRs’ or ‘Submit 
Patient EHRs’ 
doctorui_get 
• Verifies that the session user is a member of the 
SDHCARE-Doctor group 
• Verifies that the doctor’s clinic is granted access to 
the patient’s EHRs (using accessControlSC, which 
is covered in Section 3.3.4) 
• Displays a list of EHRs and hashes to the doctor, 
which are indexed using patients’ fingerprints 
(from the Ethereum ehrHashTable); these records 
are formatted in a table before being passed to 
doctors 
• Once the doctor selects an EHR, this verifies that 
the cloud EHR's hash is the same as the hash in 
ehrHashTable  
• Retrieves the EHR from Cloudstore 
doctorui_submit 
• Verifies that the session user is a member of the 
SDHCARE-Doctor group 
• Verifies that the doctor’s clinic is granted access to 
a patient’s EHRs using the patient’s fingerprint 
(using accessControlSC, which is covered in 
Section 3.3.4) 
• Creates an EHR based on information submitted by 
a doctor; the EHR is stored in the Ethereum 
ehrHashTable. A Merkle root hash is calculated for 
the EHR and uploaded with the record 
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Table 7: Summary of Forms Functions 
Name Description 
getProviderInfo Presents one input field to the provider’s 
admin: the provider’s Ethereum address 
(OHP) 
submitProviderInfo Presents two input fields to the 
provider’s admin: provider name and 
provider web address 
bookAppointment Presents to the receptionist the following 
fields: name, fingerprint, date, time, 
dropdown for the clinics 
getAppointments Present to the receptionist a single field: 
the patient’s fingerprint 
newPatient Presents to the receptionist the following 
fields: name, date of birth, and 
fingerprint 
submitRecords Presents to the doctor the following 
fields: patient name, patient fingerprint, 
record name, record date, and record 
description 
getRecords Presents to the doctor one field: 
fingerprint 
 
Table 8: Summary of Tables Functions 
Name Description 
appointmentTable Formats the appointments retrieved from 
the local database in a table before 
posting them to the receptionist  
ehrTable Format the EHR list retrieved from the 
Ethereum ehrHashTable in a table before 
posting them to the doctor 
 
Figures 26 to 32 are examples of the UIs displayed to different users. These 
pages represent the combined version of base.html and functional templates with some 
images rendered from static fills.  
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Figure 26: SDHCARE Home Page 
 
 
Figure 27: SDHCARE About Page 
 
81 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: SDHCARE Login Page 
 
 
Figure 29: SDHCARE Admin UI Page 
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Figure 30: SDHCARE Admin UI Submit Page 
 
 
Figure 31: SDHCARE-Reception UI Page 
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Figure 32: SDHCARE Doctor UI Page 
 
3.3.4 Building Ethereum Smart Contracts 
The prototype for DHCARE has three smart contracts, known as dnsSC, 
patientsSC, and accessControlSC, which provide the functions described in Section 
2.1.3. The main reason for creating three smart contracts instead of a combined one is 
to provide flexibility in extending the functionality of the SDHCARE prototype 
through inheriting and importing smart contract functions.  
The dnsSC has two functions: 
• createProvider: This function takes two string inputs for the healthcare 
provider’s name and web address. These values are stored in the 
providersTable immutable table, which is indexed by the provider’s 
Ethereum address (OHP). In the case of an existing provider, the 
function returns an exception error.  
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• getProvider: This function takes an address input (OHP) and returns 
two string variables that represent the provider name and web address, 
which are stored in providersTable. 
Similar to dnsSC, accessControlSC has two functions: 
• addClinic: This function takes two string inputs representing the 
patient’s fingerprint hash and the clinic ID. The clinic ID is polled from 
the SQLite3 department database. Both strings are stored in an array 
indexed by the patient’s fingerprint hash that represents all the clinics 
that can access the patient’s EHRs. This array is part of patientsTable. 
• grantClinicAccess: This function takes two string inputs, namely the 
patient’s fingerprint hash and the clinic ID. It performs a lookup in the 
patientsTable, using the patient’s fingerprint hash array to determine 
whether the clinicID is listed. If the clinicID is listed in the array, it 
returns ‘True’, which allows the doctor to access the patient’s EHR. 
Otherwise, it returns ‘False’, which denies doctor’s access. 
The patientsSC includes the following four functions: 
• createPatient: This function accepts string inputs for the patient’s 
fingerprint hash, provider Ethereum address, and reception ID. It stores 
this information in patientsTable indexed by fingerprint hash.  
• getPatient: This function accepts a string input of the patient’s 
fingerprint hash and returns the patient’s stored values in patientsTable 
(i.e., provider’s address and reception ID). 
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• createEHR: This function accepts the patient’s fingerprint hash, EHR 
name, date, status, and Merkle root hash. It stores the values in 
ehrHashTable indexed by fingerprint hash. 
• getEHR: This function accepts a fingerprint hash input string and 
returns the patient EHR list. For each EHR, the returned values are 
name, date, Merkle root hash, and EHR status.  
The smart contracts were deployed in Ethereum using MetaMask soft wallet, 
and each contract is allocated a unique address for communication. Figure 33 is a 
summary of transactions between a healthcare provider and Ethereum, including smart 
contract deployments (The account of the test provider was used to deploy smart 
contracts for demo purposes. In a real-life implementation, such contracts should be 
deployed once by the owner of the project). 
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Figure 33: Summary of Ethereum Transactions 
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3.3.5 Integrating Django with Ethereum  
The integration between the Django web application and Ethereum was 
implemented using Web3 customized Python modules on the Django side and the 
Infura mining pool on the Ethereum side. Figure 34 is a summary of the integration 
between Django and Ethereum.  
 
Figure 34: Integrating Django with Ethereum 
 
To communicate with Ethereum Blockchain, the healthcare provider should 
contribute with a dedicated mining node running Ethereum mining software (e.g., Get 
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Ethereum, or GETH). A dedicated node is used to ensure patients’ privacy. For the 
prototype, Infura mining pool was used, which offers mining nodes as a service to 
interact with Ethereum. The free version of Infura offers 100,000 Ethereum 
transactions within 24 hours. An Infura account was created, which provides a unique 
URL to communicate with Infura nodes for posting and reading blocks to and from 
Ethereum. Figure 35 shows the details of the Infura test account.
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Figure 35: Infura Account Details 
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For Django Views to interact with Ethereum, custom Python modules were 
built utilizing Web3 APIs. Each Python module has functions to interact with the 
respective smart contract functions. Figure 36 summarizes the operation of the Python 
modules.  
 
Figure 36: Custom Python Module Operation 
91 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Testing and Performance Evaluation 
 
This chapter describes the testing and evaluation of SDHCARE prototype 
implementation from functional, security, and performance perspectives.  Functional 
testing ensured that the prototype is operating as expected by design. Security testing 
validated the security measures implemented in the prototype to protect it against 
unauthorized access and modifications of EHRs. Performance evaluation measured the 
elapsed time required to gain read or write access to EHRs.  
4.1 Functional Testing 
The functional testing evaluated the SDHCARE prototype against the design 
requirements discussed in previous chapters. Below is a list of evaluation metrics: 
• The system should provide a mechanism to exchange and synchronize 
EHRs between distributed providers using Blockchain and the cloud 
store. 
• The system should provide patients with a secure mechanism to recover 
access to their EHRs. 
• The system should ensure unique mapping between patients’ identities 
and their respective EHRs. 
The exchange and synchronization of EHRs between distributed providers was 
achieved using Ethereum public Blockchain and MS Azure Files. This was validated 
by accessing the EHRs of the same patient from two SDHCARE providers using the 
patient’s fingerprint (after granting access to each provider). Figure 37 shows access 
results from the two SDHCARE providers. 
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Figure 37: Synchronization of Patient’s EHR  
 
To validate the access recovery mechanism for patients’ EHRs, fingerprints 
hashes were used as index keys to retrieve the EHR List from ehrHashTable. Figure 
38 shows the requirement to provide a fingerprint in the Doctor UI to retrieve EHRs.  
 
Figure 38: Verifying EHR Recovery Using Patient ID 
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The unique mapping between patients’ fingerprints and their EHRs was 
validated by comparing the Merkle root hash values in ehrHashTable of the patient 
against the files’ names stored in MS Azure Files. Figure 39 shows a sample 
verification. 
 
Figure 39: Verifying Hash as Names in Azure Files 
 
4.2 Security Testing 
The security testing of SDHCARE prototype covered the following aspects, 
which were discussed in previous chapters: 
• The system should provide an access control mechanism to ensure 
authorized access to EHRs.  
• The system should log all read/write activities on EHRs. 
• The system should provide anonymity of EHRs in the cloud store. 
• The system should validate the integrity of EHRs for read requests. 
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The access control system in SDHCARE was implemented at multiple levels. 
The first level of authorization was implemented in Django directory services to 
validate the group membership of the user. This ensured that only authorized users can 
access their role-specific UIs. Figure 40 shows a blocked attempt from a doctor 
attempting to access Reception UI. 
 
Figure 40: Failed Login to Reception Portal using a Doctor Account 
 
The next level of authorization was implemented using patients’ fingerprints 
to grant doctors read or write access to EHRs. Unless a valid fingerprint is submitted 
by the patient, clinic doctors cannot access EHRs. Figures 41, 42, and 43 show a failed 
attempt to access a patient’s EHR.  
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Figure 41: Fingerprint Validation before Writing an EHR 
 
 
Figure 42: Failed Attempt to Write a New EHR 
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Figure 43: Failed Attempt to Read a Patient’s HER 
 
All EHR read/write activities are logged in Ethereum Blockchain for audit 
trace purposes. The log messages include a unique hash identifier, the Ethereum 
address of the healthcare provider, a timestamp, and activity details. Figure 44 shows 
an example from EtherScan.  
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Figure 44: Sample Audit Logs for New EHR 
 
The data stored in Azure Files were anonymized using Merkle hash values as 
EHR names and suppressing patients’ PII. This ensured that patients’ identities are not 
traceable from the EHR raw data. Figure 45 shows an example of anonymized data 
stored in MS Azure Files from the SDHCARE prototype.  
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Figure 45: Sample of Anonymized Data Store in Azure Files
 
98 
99 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Performance Evaluation 
Among all the modules in the DHCARE design, blockchain is considered the 
slowest component, compared to the processing speed of the other modules. This 
slowness is caused by the PoW consensus algorithm used in Ethereum. Hence it was 
the focus for performance evaluation. The time delay introduced by the blockchain 
layer was evaluated by validating access requests and the granting of access to EHRs. 
These two components are controlled by accessControlSC smart contract and 
patientsSC smart contract. To isolate the impact of copying speed of EHRs to the cloud 
and obtain accurate performance measures for the blockchain, the EHR test samples 
used small text files (< 20 KB). For the write test, a test patient was created and sample 
EHRs written into the patient's respective ehrHashTable. For the read test, each EHR 
sample stored in the ehrHashTable was read. In total, 15 samples were collected for 
read and write without/with accessControlSC smart contract. 
The time delay between requests and responses was measured using Google 
Chrome Developer Tools. Figure 46 shows a sample time delay measurement. 
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Figure 46: Performance Measurement using Google Chrome 
 
All the evaluation test cases were executed using the same internet line to 
connect to Ethereum Blockchain and Azure Files. Figures 47 and 48 summarize the 
performance results.  
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Figure 47: Read Performance Testing 
 
 
Figure 48: Write Performance Testing 
 
Read performance was superior to the write performance. The average read 
time was 8.81 seconds while the average write time was 16 seconds, i.e. approximately 
twice the read time. This observation held with and without access control. In terms of 
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today’s Internet speeds, the read and write times are considered low performance. 
However, in the real-life circumstances of most healthcare environments such time 
delays are acceptable. The main reason for these delays is the consensus algorithm 
used by Ethereum blockchain to validate and accept blocks. Another important factor 
is the load of the mining pool and its incentive to mine the block.  
From the results, it can be concluded that no significant overhead delay is 
added by implementing access control in Blockchain using accessControlSC smart 
contract. This is because a single block includes thousands of transactions, and 
transactions from both accessContractSC and paitentsSC are usually mined in a single 
block (the decision to group the transactions in blocks is subject to the miner). Hence, 
there is no difference between sending two transactions or one transaction as they are 
mined in the same block. In one EHR sample (sample 6 in the write test with access 
control), the transactions were mined in two separate blocks. Hence, the time delay for 
writing the EHR metadata in ehrHashTable was 67.33 seconds.  
Another important observation from Figure 49 is that the write time was 
consistent and independent of the number of records in ehrHashTable, while the read 
time was dependent on the number of records in ehrHashTable. In this test, five more 
EHR samples were added to the test patient’s ehrHashTable (total increased to 20 
samples). After re-running the read evaluation, the average read time increased from 
8.81 seconds to 13.67 seconds. This is due to additional iterations executed in the code 
needed to list all EHR metadata associated with the patient in ehrHashTable. Code 
optimization would be required in a real-life implementation to improve the read time. 
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Figure 49: Read Time Analysis with Larger ehrHashTable 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
This research investigated access control recovery mechanisms for EHRs 
synchronized and exchanged between distributed healthcare providers using 
blockchain. The research project first reviewed the current state of research on 
blockchain in healthcare to gain understanding about the active areas. This was 
followed by narrowing the focus to research targeting blockchain in EHR systems.  
An analysis was undertaken of current challenges in blockchain-based EHR 
systems and the requirements to achieve successful access control recovery 
mechanism for EHRs. Accordingly, the researcher proposed SDHCARE, a multilayer 
system that splits the roles between healthcare providers, blockchain, and a cloud store. 
This model system should be able to recover access to EHRs from any provider within 
the blockchain network. Additionally, the model may accelerate the migration of 
healthcare providers to blockchain-based systems through the availability of external 
UI integration with existing legacy healthcare environments.  
A prototype was built to validate the proposed approach using Django, Python, 
Ethereum, and MS Azure. The prototype was coded to simulate all functional 
requirements and integrate the distributed layers of the design. This was followed by 
system validation and testing for functional requirements, security requirements, and 
performance. The results indicated successful operation of the proposed design from a 
functional and security perspective. The performance of the prototype was slow due 
to the functional operation of the Ethereum blockchain. However, this latency may be 
tolerable in healthcare environments.  
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For future work, the researcher will evaluate SDHCARE design against hybrid 
blockchain ledgers that use faster consensus algorithms. This will aim to enhance the 
performance of SDHCARE for EHRs read/write while maintaining the extended 
accessibility to the solution. Additionally, the prototype will be upgraded to use 
advanced biometrics combining multiple fingerprints for more accuracy and privacy, 
and the results should be evaluated against performance overhead. Another planned 
enhancement in SDHCARE will be to introduce additional roles in access control 
smart contract, including access delegation, access revocation, and record deletion. 
Finally, the researcher will evaluate the use of mobile-based biometric scanning to 
extend patients’ manageability of access rights to EHRs. 
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Appendix 
 
This section will cover the low-level coding of DHCARE Django and 
Ethereum components.  
Appendix A – Ethereum Smart Contracts 
Smart Contract dnsSC 
pragma solidity ^0.6.1; 
 
contract dnsSC{ 
     
    struct provider{ 
        string name; 
        string webAddress; 
    } 
     
    mapping (address => provider) providersTable; 
     
    function createProvider (string memory _name, string memory 
_webAddress) public { 
        address OHP = msg.sender; 
        providersTable[OHP] = provider (_name, _webAddress); 
    } 
     
    function getProvider (address _OHP) public view returns (string memory 
_name, string memory _webAddress) { 
        _name = providersTable[_OHP].name; 
        _webAddress = providersTable[_OHP].webAddress; 
    } 
     
} 
 
Smart Contract patientsSC 
pragma solidity ^0.6.1; 
 
contract patientsSC{ 
 
    struct patient{ 
        string OHP; 
        string receptionID; 
    } 
 
    struct ehr{ 
        string name; 
        string hash; 
        string status; 
        string date; 
    } 
 
    mapping (uint => patient) patientsTable; 
    mapping (uint => ehr[]) ehrHashTable; 
 
    function createPatient (uint _fingerprint, string memory _OHP, string 
memory _receptionID) public { 
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        patientsTable[_fingerprint] = patient (_OHP, _receptionID); 
    } 
 
    function getPatient (uint _fingerprint) public view returns (string 
memory _OHP, string memory _receptionID) { 
        _OHP = patientsTable[_fingerprint].OHP; 
        _receptionID = patientsTable[_fingerprint].receptionID; 
    } 
 
    function createEhr (uint _fingerprint, string memory _name, string 
memory _hash, string memory _status, string memory _date) public { 
        ehrHashTable[_fingerprint].push (ehr(_name, _hash, _status, 
_date)); 
    } 
 
    function getEhr (uint _fingerprint, uint _count) public view returns 
(string memory _name, string memory _hash, string memory _status, string 
memory _date) { 
        _name = ehrHashTable[_fingerprint][_count].name; 
        _hash = ehrHashTable[_fingerprint][_count].hash; 
        _status = ehrHashTable[_fingerprint][_count].status; 
        _date = ehrHashTable[_fingerprint][_count].date; 
    } 
 
} 
Smart Contract accessControlSC 
pragma solidity ^0.6.1; 
 
contract accessControlSC{ 
 
    mapping (string => string[]) PACL; 
 
    function addClinic (string memory _fingerprint, string memory 
_clinicID) public { 
        PACL[_fingerprint].push (_clinicID); 
    } 
 
    function grantClinicAccess (string memory _fingerprint, string memory 
_clinicID) public view returns (string memory) { 
 
        uint i; 
        for (i=0; i<=PACL[_fingerprint].length; i++){ 
            if (keccak256(abi.encodePacked((PACL[_fingerprint][i]))) == 
keccak256(abi.encodePacked((_clinicID)))){ 
                return 'true'; 
            } 
        } 
        return 'false'; 
    } 
} 
 
Appendix B – Ethereum Smart Contract ABIs 
accessControlSC_abi.json 
[ 
   { 
      "inputs": [ 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_fingerprint", 
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            "type": "string" 
         }, 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_clinicID", 
            "type": "string" 
         } 
      ], 
      "name": "addClinic", 
      "outputs": [], 
      "stateMutability": "nonpayable", 
      "type": "function" 
   }, 
   { 
      "inputs": [ 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_fingerprint", 
            "type": "string" 
         }, 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_clinicID", 
            "type": "string" 
         } 
      ], 
      "name": "grantClinicAccess", 
      "outputs": [ 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "", 
            "type": "string" 
         } 
      ], 
      "stateMutability": "view", 
      "type": "function" 
   } 
] 
 
patientsSC_abi.json 
[ 
   { 
      "inputs": [ 
         { 
            "internalType": "uint256", 
            "name": "_fingerprint", 
            "type": "uint256" 
         }, 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_name", 
            "type": "string" 
         }, 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_hash", 
            "type": "string" 
         }, 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_status", 
            "type": "string" 
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         }, 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_date", 
            "type": "string" 
         } 
      ], 
      "name": "createEhr", 
      "outputs": [], 
      "stateMutability": "nonpayable", 
      "type": "function" 
   }, 
   { 
      "inputs": [ 
         { 
            "internalType": "uint256", 
            "name": "_fingerprint", 
            "type": "uint256" 
         }, 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_OHP", 
            "type": "string" 
         }, 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_receptionID", 
            "type": "string" 
         } 
      ], 
      "name": "createPatient", 
      "outputs": [], 
      "stateMutability": "nonpayable", 
      "type": "function" 
   }, 
   { 
      "inputs": [ 
         { 
            "internalType": "uint256", 
            "name": "_fingerprint", 
            "type": "uint256" 
         }, 
         { 
            "internalType": "uint256", 
            "name": "_count", 
            "type": "uint256" 
         } 
      ], 
      "name": "getEhr", 
      "outputs": [ 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_name", 
            "type": "string" 
         }, 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_hash", 
            "type": "string" 
         }, 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_status", 
            "type": "string" 
         }, 
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         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_date", 
            "type": "string" 
         } 
      ], 
      "stateMutability": "view", 
      "type": "function" 
   }, 
   { 
      "inputs": [ 
         { 
            "internalType": "uint256", 
            "name": "_fingerprint", 
            "type": "uint256" 
         } 
      ], 
      "name": "getPatient", 
      "outputs": [ 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_OHP", 
            "type": "string" 
         }, 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_receptionID", 
            "type": "string" 
         } 
      ], 
      "stateMutability": "view", 
      "type": "function" 
   } 
] 
 
dnsSC_abi.json 
[ 
   { 
      "inputs": [ 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_name", 
            "type": "string" 
         }, 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_webAddress", 
            "type": "string" 
         } 
      ], 
      "name": "createProvider", 
      "outputs": [], 
      "stateMutability": "nonpayable", 
      "type": "function" 
   }, 
   { 
      "inputs": [ 
         { 
            "internalType": "address", 
            "name": "_OHP", 
            "type": "address" 
         } 
116 
 
 
 
 
      ], 
      "name": "getProvider", 
      "outputs": [ 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_name", 
            "type": "string" 
         }, 
         { 
            "internalType": "string", 
            "name": "_webAddress", 
            "type": "string" 
         } 
      ], 
      "stateMutability": "view", 
      "type": "function" 
   } 
] 
 
Appendix C – Django Main Application Code 
urls.py 
from dhcare import views as dhcare_views 
from django.contrib import admin 
from django.contrib.auth import views as auth_views 
from django.urls import path, include 
 
urlpatterns = [ 
    path('admin/', admin.site.urls), 
    path('adminui/', dhcare_views.adminui, name='adminui'), 
    path('receptionui/', dhcare_views.receptionui, name='receptionui'), 
    path('receptionui-get/', dhcare_views.receptionui_get, 
name='receptionui-get'), 
    path('receptionui-book/', dhcare_views.receptionui_book, 
name='receptionui-book'), 
    path('appointment-confirm/', dhcare_views.appointment_confirm, 
name='appointment-confirm'), 
    path('doctorui-get/', dhcare_views.doctorui_get, name='doctorui-get'), 
    path('doctorui-submit/', dhcare_views.doctorui_submit, name='doctorui-
submit'), 
    path('doctorui/', dhcare_views.doctorui, name='doctorui'), 
    path('new-patient/', dhcare_views.new_patient, name='new-patient'), 
    path('adminui-get/', dhcare_views.adminui_get, name='adminui_get'), 
    path('adminui-submit/', dhcare_views.adminui_submit, 
name='adminui_submit'), 
    path('login/', 
auth_views.LoginView.as_view(template_name='dhcare/login.html'), 
name='login'), 
    path('logout/', 
auth_views.LogoutView.as_view(template_name='dhcare/logout.html'), 
name='logout'), 
    path('', include('dhcare.urls')), 
] 
 
settings.py  
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# SECURITY WARNING: don't run with debug turned on in production! 
DEBUG = True 
 
ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*'] 
# Application definition 
 
INSTALLED_APPS = [ 
    'dhcare.apps.DhcareConfig', 
    'crispy_forms', 
    'django_tables2', 
    'django.contrib.admin', 
    'django.contrib.auth', 
    'django.contrib.contenttypes', 
    'django.contrib.sessions', 
    'django.contrib.messages', 
    'django.contrib.staticfiles', 
] 
 
STATIC_URL = '/static/' 
 
CRISPY_TEMPLATE_PACK = 'bootstrap4' 
 
LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL = 'dhcare-home' 
LOGIN_URL = 'login' 
 
Appendix D – Django DHCARE Application Code 
accessControlSC.py  
import json 
 
from web3 import Web3 
 
 
def accessControlSC_add(fingerprint, clinic_id): 
    infura_url = 
'https://ropsten.infura.io/v3/db1690d7911842a6a0ec7690d08a0ca3' 
    web3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(infura_url)) 
 
    with open('dhcare/accessControlSC_abi.json') as json_file: 
        accessControlSC_abi = json.load(json_file) 
 
    accessControlSC_address = '0x1b3135e3Cd2Ee573A2caC760561A15DB22ac92A3' 
 
    accessControlSC = web3.eth.contract(address=accessControlSC_address, 
abi=accessControlSC_abi) 
    key = 
'0x3E67D814F4794E3172A94C8AF582C75A6B4868F4FAC912F234E78AE97D44518A' 
    acct = web3.eth.account.privateKeyToAccount(key) 
    account_address = acct.address 
 
    try: 
        tx = accessControlSC.functions.addClinic(fingerprint, 
clinic_id).buildTransaction( 
            {'nonce': web3.eth.getTransactionCount(account_address)}) 
        signed_tx = web3.eth.account.signTransaction(tx, key) 
        hash = web3.eth.sendRawTransaction(signed_tx.rawTransaction) 
        
tx_receipt=web3.eth.waitForTransactionReceipt(hash).get('transactionHash').
hex() 
        return ('The appointment has been confirmed and access granted to 
the clinic. Your Transaction Ref. is ' 
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                + str(tx_receipt) + ' Please remember it for tracking 
purpose') 
    except: 
        return ('Unable to Submit Information') 
 
 
def accessControlSC_check(fingerprint, clinic_id): 
    infura_url = 
'https://ropsten.infura.io/v3/db1690d7911842a6a0ec7690d08a0ca3' 
    web3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(infura_url)) 
 
    with open('dhcare/accessControlSC_abi.json') as json_file: 
        accessControlSC_abi = json.load(json_file) 
 
    accessControlSC_address = '0x1b3135e3Cd2Ee573A2caC760561A15DB22ac92A3' 
 
    accessControlSC = web3.eth.contract(address=accessControlSC_address, 
abi=accessControlSC_abi) 
 
    try: 
        accessRequest = 
accessControlSC.functions.grantClinicAccess(fingerprint, clinic_id).call() 
        return (accessRequest) 
    except: 
        return ('You are unauthorized to access or modify records for this 
patient') 
 
patientsSC.py 
import json 
 
from web3 import Web3 
 
def patientsSC_patient_post(fingerprint, ohp, reception_id): 
    infura_url = 
'https://ropsten.infura.io/v3/db1690d7911842a6a0ec7690d08a0ca3' 
    web3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(infura_url)) 
 
    with open('dhcare/patientsSC_abi.json') as json_file: 
        patientsSC_abi = json.load(json_file) 
 
    patientsSC_address = '0xD1b73bd5256a30Af32664D135618A41975f80823' 
 
    patientsSC = web3.eth.contract(address=patientsSC_address, 
abi=patientsSC_abi) 
    key = 
'0x3E67D814F4794E3172A94C8AF582C75A6B4868F4FAC912F234E78AE97D44518A' 
    acct = web3.eth.account.privateKeyToAccount(key) 
    account_address = acct.address 
 
    try: 
        tx = patientsSC.functions.createPatient(fingerprint, ohp, 
reception_id).buildTransaction( 
            {'nonce': web3.eth.getTransactionCount(account_address)}) 
        signed_tx = web3.eth.account.signTransaction(tx, key) 
        hash = web3.eth.sendRawTransaction(signed_tx.rawTransaction) 
        
tx_receipt=web3.eth.waitForTransactionReceipt(hash).get('transactionHash').
hex() 
        return ('Patient File was Created Successfully! Transaction Ref. ' 
+ str(tx_receipt)) 
    except: 
        return ('Unable to Submit Information') 
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def patientsSC_ehr_post(fingerprint, name, hash, status, date): 
    infura_url = 
'https://ropsten.infura.io/v3/db1690d7911842a6a0ec7690d08a0ca3' 
    web3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(infura_url)) 
 
    with open('dhcare/patientsSC_abi.json') as json_file: 
        patientsSC_abi = json.load(json_file) 
 
    patientsSC_address = '0xD1b73bd5256a30Af32664D135618A41975f80823' 
 
    patientsSC = web3.eth.contract(address=patientsSC_address, 
abi=patientsSC_abi) 
    key = 
'0x3E67D814F4794E3172A94C8AF582C75A6B4868F4FAC912F234E78AE97D44518A' 
    acct = web3.eth.account.privateKeyToAccount(key) 
    account_address = acct.address 
 
    try: 
        tx = patientsSC.functions.createEhr(fingerprint, name, hash, 
status, date).buildTransaction( 
            {'nonce': web3.eth.getTransactionCount(account_address)}) 
        signed_tx = web3.eth.account.signTransaction(tx, key) 
        hash = web3.eth.sendRawTransaction(signed_tx.rawTransaction) 
        
tx_receipt=web3.eth.waitForTransactionReceipt(hash).get('transactionHash').
hex() 
        return ('Patient Records Uploaded Sucessfully! Transaction Ref. ' + 
str(tx_receipt)) 
    except: 
        return ('Unable to Upload Reocrds') 
 
def patientsSC_ehr_get(fingerprint): 
    infura_url = 
'https://ropsten.infura.io/v3/db1690d7911842a6a0ec7690d08a0ca3' 
    web3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(infura_url)) 
 
    with open('dhcare/patientsSC_abi.json') as json_file: 
        patientsSC_abi = json.load(json_file) 
 
    patientsSC_address = '0xD1b73bd5256a30Af32664D135618A41975f80823' 
 
    patientsSC = web3.eth.contract(address=patientsSC_address, 
abi=patientsSC_abi) 
 
    try: 
        count = 0 
        getEhr = patientsSC.functions.getEhr(fingerprint, count).call() 
        output = [{'id':count, 'record_name':getEhr[0], 
'record_hash':getEhr[1], 'record_status':getEhr[2], 
'record_date':getEhr[3]}] 
        while True: 
            try: 
                count = count + 1 
                getEhr = patientsSC.functions.getEhr(fingerprint, 
count).call() 
                output.append({'id':count, 'record_name':getEhr[0], 
'record_hash':getEhr[1], 'record_status':getEhr[2], 
'record_date':getEhr[3]}) 
            except: 
                return (output) 
    except: 
        return ('Unable to Retrieve Information') 
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dnsSC.py  
import json 
 
from web3 import Web3 
 
 
def dnsSC_get(account_address): 
    infura_url = 
'https://ropsten.infura.io/v3/db1690d7911842a6a0ec7690d08a0ca3' 
    web3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(infura_url)) 
 
    with open('dhcare/dnsSC_abi.json') as json_file: 
        dnsSC_abi = json.load(json_file) 
 
    dnsSC_address = '0x274D835998CDb077C224531619eB6e4D86b7739d' 
 
    dnsSC = web3.eth.contract(address=dnsSC_address, abi=dnsSC_abi) 
 
    try: 
        getProvider = dnsSC.functions.getProvider(account_address).call() 
        provider = {'provider_name': getProvider[0], 'provider_webAddress': 
getProvider[1]} 
        return (provider) 
    except: 
        return ('Unable to Retrieve Information') 
 
 
def dnsSC_post(name, webAddress): 
    infura_url = 
'https://ropsten.infura.io/v3/db1690d7911842a6a0ec7690d08a0ca3' 
    web3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(infura_url)) 
 
    with open('dhcare/dnsSC_abi.json') as json_file: 
        dnsSC_abi = json.load(json_file) 
 
    dnsSC_address = '0x274D835998CDb077C224531619eB6e4D86b7739d' 
 
    dnsSC = web3.eth.contract(address=dnsSC_address, abi=dnsSC_abi) 
    key = 
'0x3E67D814F4794E3172A94C8AF582C75A6B4868F4FAC912F234E78AE97D44518A' 
    acct = web3.eth.account.privateKeyToAccount(key) 
    account_address = acct.address 
 
    try: 
        tx = dnsSC.functions.createProvider(name, 
webAddress).buildTransaction( 
            {'nonce': web3.eth.getTransactionCount(account_address)}) 
        signed_tx = web3.eth.account.signTransaction(tx, key) 
        hash = web3.eth.sendRawTransaction(signed_tx.rawTransaction) 
        
tx_receipt=web3.eth.waitForTransactionReceipt(hash).get('transactionHash').
hex() 
        return ('Information was Submitted Successfully! Transaction Ref. ' 
+ str(tx_receipt)) 
    except: 
        return ('Unable to Submit Information') 
 
admin.py 
from django.contrib import admin 
from django.contrib.auth.admin import UserAdmin 
from django.contrib.auth.models import User 
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from .models import provider, department, appointment, Profile 
 
class ProfileInline(admin.StackedInline): 
    model = Profile 
    can_delete = False 
    verbose_name_plural = 'Profile' 
    fk_name = 'user' 
 
class CustomUserAdmin(UserAdmin): 
    inlines = (ProfileInline, ) 
 
    def get_inline_instances(self, request, obj=None): 
        if not obj: 
            return list() 
        return super(CustomUserAdmin, self).get_inline_instances(request, 
obj) 
 
admin.site.register(provider) 
admin.site.register(department) 
admin.site.register(appointment) 
admin.site.unregister(User) 
admin.site.register(User, CustomUserAdmin) 
 
 
 
apps.py 
from django.apps import AppConfig 
 
 
class DhcareConfig(AppConfig): 
    name = 'dhcare' 
 
azure_files.py 
from azure.storage.file import FileService 
from azure.storage.file import ContentSettings 
 
file_service = FileService(account_name='dhcarestorage', 
                           
account_key='ArdixcQfhaAfmwC9XueTPaJYXEDXa3CXlXoYZ7Z76GigvDWJz4WDDqmxQtB61q
IPk+4rr+r71WXEZQX8OruIsQ==') 
 
 
# file_service.create_share('dhcare')   
 
# def get_file(): 
#     name = '' 
#     value = '' 
#     file_service.get_file_to_text('dhcare', None, name, encoding='utf-8') 
#     return (name) 
 
 
def create_ehr(name, value): 
    file_service.create_file_from_text( 
        'dhcare', 
        None,  # We want to create this blob in the root directory, so we 
specify None for the directory_name  
        name, 
        value, 
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        encoding = 'utf-8', 
        content_settings = ContentSettings(content_type='txt')) 
 
custom_decorators.py 
from functools import wraps 
from urllib.parse import urlparse 
 
from django.conf import settings 
from django.contrib import messages 
from django.contrib.auth import REDIRECT_FIELD_NAME 
from django.shortcuts import resolve_url 
 
 
def custom_user_passes_test(test_func, login_url=None, 
redirect_field_name=REDIRECT_FIELD_NAME): 
    """ 
    Decorator for views that checks that the user passes the given test, 
    redirecting to the log-in page if necessary. The test should be a 
callable 
    that takes the user object and returns True if the user passes. 
    """ 
 
    def decorator(view_func): 
        @wraps(view_func) 
        def _wrapped_view(request, *args, **kwargs): 
            if test_func(request.user): 
                return view_func(request, *args, **kwargs) 
            path = request.build_absolute_uri() 
            resolved_login_url = resolve_url(login_url or 
settings.LOGIN_URL) 
            # If the login url is the same scheme and net location then 
just 
            # use the path as the "next" url. 
            login_scheme, login_netloc = urlparse(resolved_login_url)[:2] 
            current_scheme, current_netloc = urlparse(path)[:2] 
            if ((not login_scheme or login_scheme == current_scheme) and 
                    (not login_netloc or login_netloc == current_netloc)): 
                path = request.get_full_path() 
            from django.contrib.auth.views import redirect_to_login 
            messages.warning(request, 'Unauthorized Access! You need to 
login successfully') 
            return redirect_to_login( 
                path, resolved_login_url, redirect_field_name) 
 
        return _wrapped_view 
 
    return decorator 
 
forms.py 
from django import forms 
 
from .models import appointment 
 
 
# By default DateInput takes input as string. Using this class, we can 
change the input as Calender 
class DateInput(forms.DateInput): 
    input_type = 'date' 
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class TimeInput(forms.TimeInput): 
    input_type = 'time' 
 
 
class getProviderInfo(forms.Form): 
    OHP_Eth = forms.CharField(label='Hospital Ethereum Address', 
max_length=100) 
 
 
class submitProviderInfo(forms.Form): 
    name = forms.CharField(label='Hospital Name', max_length=100) 
    webAddress = forms.CharField(label='Hospital Web Address', 
max_length=100) 
 
 
class bookAppointment(forms.ModelForm): 
    class Meta: 
        model = appointment 
        fields = ['name', 'nid', 'date', 'time', 'department_code'] 
        labels = { 
            'name': 'Patient Name', 
            'nid': 'National ID', 
            'date': 'Date', 
            'time': 'Time', 
            'department_code': 'Clinic' 
        } 
        widgets = {'date': DateInput(), 'time': TimeInput()} 
 
 
class getAppointments(forms.Form): 
    nid = forms.IntegerField(label='Patient National ID') 
 
class newPatient(forms.Form): 
    name = forms.CharField(label='Patient Name', max_length=100) 
    dob = forms.DateField(label='Date of Birth', widget=DateInput) 
    fingerprint = forms.CharField(label='Fingerprint', max_length=100) 
 
 
class submitRecords(forms.Form): 
    patient_name = forms.CharField(label='Patient Name', max_length=100) 
    patient_fingerprint = forms.CharField(label='Fingerprint', 
max_length=100) 
    record_name = forms.CharField(label='Record Name', max_length=100) 
    record_date = forms.DateField(label='Date', widget=DateInput) 
    record_description = forms.CharField(label='Records', 
widget=forms.Textarea) 
 
class getRecords(forms.Form): 
    patient_fingerprint = forms.CharField(label='Patient Fingerprint', 
max_length=100) 
models.py 
from django.db import models 
from django.utils import timezone 
from django.contrib.auth.models import User 
from django.db.models.signals import post_save 
from django.dispatch import receiver 
 
class department(models.Model): 
    code = models.IntegerField(unique=True, primary_key=True) 
    name = models.CharField(max_length=100) 
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    # This is required to show the name attribute of the database instead 
of 'department object (code)' 
    # in the drop-down 
    def __str__(self): 
        return self.name 
 
 
class provider(models.Model): 
    ohp = models.CharField(max_length=100, primary_key=True) 
    secret = models.CharField(max_length=100) 
 
    def __str__(self): 
        return self.ohp 
 
 
class appointment(models.Model): 
    name = models.CharField(max_length=100) 
    nid = models.IntegerField() 
    date = models.DateField(default=timezone.now) 
    time = models.TimeField(default=timezone.now) 
 
    # This is better than 'CHOICES' because 'CHOICES' need static values 
for the drop-down but this is 
    # polled from the database department 
    department_code = models.ForeignKey('department', 
on_delete=models.CASCADE) 
 
    def __str__(self): 
        return self.name 
 
class Profile(models.Model): 
    user = models.OneToOneField(User, on_delete=models.CASCADE) 
    department_code = models.ForeignKey('department', 
on_delete=models.CASCADE, blank=True) 
 
@receiver(post_save, sender=User) 
def create_or_update_user_profile(sender, instance, created, **kwargs): 
    if created: 
        Profile.objects.create(user=instance) 
    instance.profile.save() 
 
tables.py 
import django_tables2 as tables 
 
from .models import appointment 
 
 
class appointmentTable(tables.Table): 
    department_code = tables.Column(verbose_name='Clinic') 
    #nid = tables.Column(verbose_name='National ID') 
    # id = tables.Column(visible=False) 
    id = tables.CheckBoxColumn(accessor='id') 
 
    class Meta: 
        model = appointment 
        template_name = "django_tables2/bootstrap4.html" 
 
class ehrTable(tables.Table): 
    id = tables.CheckBoxColumn(accessor='id') 
    record_name = tables.Column(verbose_name='Record Name', 
order_by='name') 
    record_date = tables.Column(verbose_name='Record Date') 
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    record_hash = tables.Column(verbose_name=' Record Hash') 
    record_status = tables.Column(verbose_name='Record Status') 
 
    class Meta: 
        template_name = "django_tables2/bootstrap4.html" 
 
urls.py 
from django.urls import path 
 
from . import views 
 
urlpatterns = [ 
    path('', views.home, name='dhcare-home'), 
    path('about/', views.about, name='dhcare-about'), 
] 
 
views.py 
import hashlib 
 
from django.contrib import messages 
from django.contrib.auth.models import Group 
from django.shortcuts import render 
from django.contrib.auth.models import User 
from .accessControlSC import accessControlSC_add, accessControlSC_check 
from .custom_decorators import custom_user_passes_test 
from .dnsSC import dnsSC_get, dnsSC_post 
from .forms import getProviderInfo, submitProviderInfo, getAppointments, 
getRecords 
from .forms import submitRecords, bookAppointment, newPatient 
from .models import appointment, provider, department 
from .patientsSC import patientsSC_patient_post, patientsSC_ehr_post, 
patientsSC_ehr_get 
from .tables import appointmentTable, ehrTable 
from django_tables2 import RequestConfig 
from .azure_files import create_ehr 
 
 
def home(request): 
    return render(request, 'dhcare/home.html') 
 
 
def about(request): 
    return render(request, 'dhcare/about.html', {'title': 'About'}) 
 
 
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-Admins') 
in u.groups.all()) 
def adminui(request): 
    return render(request, 'dhcare/adminui.html') 
 
 
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-Admins') 
in u.groups.all()) 
def adminui_get(request): 
    # if this is a POST request we need to process the form data 
    if request.method == 'POST': 
        # create a form instance and populate it with data from the 
request: 
        form = getProviderInfo(request.POST) 
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        # check whether it's valid: 
        if form.is_valid(): 
            account_address = form.cleaned_data.get('OHP_Eth') 
            provider = dnsSC_get(account_address) 
            context = { 
                'provider': provider 
            } 
 
            return render(request, 'dhcare/adminui-get.html', context) 
 
    # if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form 
    else: 
        form = getProviderInfo() 
 
    return render(request, 'dhcare/adminui-get.html', {'form': form}) 
 
 
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-Admins') 
in u.groups.all()) 
def adminui_submit(request): 
    # if this is a POST request we need to process the form data 
    if request.method == 'POST': 
        # create a form instance and populate it with data from the 
request: 
        form = submitProviderInfo(request.POST) 
        # check whether it's valid: 
        if form.is_valid(): 
            providerTx = dnsSC_post(form.cleaned_data.get('name'), 
form.cleaned_data.get('webAddress')) 
            context = { 
                'providerTx': providerTx 
            } 
 
            return render(request, 'dhcare/adminui-submit.html', context) 
 
    # if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form 
    else: 
        form = submitProviderInfo() 
 
    return render(request, 'dhcare/adminui-submit.html', {'form': form}) 
 
 
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-
Reception') in u.groups.all()) 
def receptionui(request): 
    return render(request, 'dhcare/receptionui.html') 
 
 
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-
Reception') in u.groups.all()) 
def receptionui_get(request): 
    # if this is a POST request we need to process the form data 
    if request.method == 'POST': 
        # create a form instance and populate it with data from the 
request: 
        form = getAppointments(request.POST) 
        # check whether it's valid: 
        if form.is_valid(): 
            nid = form.cleaned_data.get('nid') 
            table = appointmentTable(appointment.objects.filter(nid=nid)) 
            return render(request, 'dhcare/receptionui-get.html', {"table": 
table}) 
 
    else: 
        form = getAppointments() 
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    return render(request, 'dhcare/receptionui-get.html', {'form': form}) 
 
 
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-
Reception') in u.groups.all()) 
def new_patient(request): 
    # if this is a POST request we need to process the form data 
    if request.method == 'POST': 
        # create a form instance and populate it with data from the 
request: 
        form = newPatient(request.POST) 
        # check whether it's valid: 
        if form.is_valid(): 
            provider_db = provider.objects.all() 
            for item in provider_db: 
                ohp = str(item.ohp) 
 
            reception_db = department.objects.filter(name='Reception') 
            for item in reception_db: 
                reception_id = str(item.code) 
            name = form.cleaned_data.get('name') 
            dob = form.cleaned_data.get('dob') 
            fingerprint = form.cleaned_data.get('fingerprint') 
            confirmation = patientsSC_patient_post(int(fingerprint), name, 
str(dob), ohp, reception_id) 
 
            return render(request, 'dhcare/new-patient.html', 
{'confirmation': confirmation}) 
 
    # if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form 
    else: 
        form = newPatient() 
 
    return render(request, 'dhcare/new-patient.html', {'form': form}) 
 
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-
Reception') in u.groups.all()) 
def receptionui_book(request): 
    # if this is a POST request we need to process the form data 
    if request.method == 'POST': 
        # create a form instance and populate it with data from the 
request: 
        form = bookAppointment(request.POST) 
        # check whether it's valid: 
        if form.is_valid(): 
            form.save() 
            patient_name = form.cleaned_data.get('name') 
            messages.success(request, 'Appointment Booking Confirmed for 
Patient Name {}'.format(patient_name)) 
            return render(request, 'dhcare/receptionui.html') 
 
    # if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form 
    else: 
        form = bookAppointment() 
 
    return render(request, 'dhcare/receptionui-book.html', {'form': form}) 
 
 
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-
Reception') in u.groups.all()) 
def appointment_confirm(request): 
    if request.method == 'POST': 
        checkbox_id = request.POST.get('id') 
        checkbox_table = appointment.objects.filter(id=checkbox_id) 
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        for item in checkbox_table: 
            fingerprint = str(item.fingerprint) 
            department_code = str(item.department_code) 
        accessControlSC_tx = accessControlSC_add(fingerprint, 
department_code) 
        appointment.objects.filter(id=checkbox_id).delete() 
        return render(request, 'dhcare/appointments.html', 
{"accessControlSC_tx": accessControlSC_tx}) 
 
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-Doctors') 
in u.groups.all()) 
def doctorui(request): 
    return render(request, 'dhcare/doctorui.html') 
 
 
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-Doctors') 
in u.groups.all()) 
def doctorui_get(request): 
    # if this is a POST request we need to process the form data 
    if request.method == 'POST': 
        # create a form instance and populate it with data from the 
request: 
        form = getRecords(request.POST) 
        # check whether it's valid: 
        if form.is_valid(): 
            fingerprint = form.cleaned_data.get("patient_fingerprint") 
            user = User.objects.get(username=request.user) 
            clinic_id = user.profile.department_code 
            accessRequest = accessControlSC_check(str(fingerprint), 
str(clinic_id)) 
            if accessRequest is True: 
                getEHR = patientsSC_ehr_get(int(fingerprint)) 
                table = ehrTable(getEHR) 
                RequestConfig(request).configure(table) 
                return render(request, 'dhcare/doctorui-get.html', 
{'getEHR':table}) 
            else: 
                return render(request, 'dhcare/doctorui-get.html', 
{'error': accessRequest}) 
 
    # if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form 
    else: 
        form = getRecords() 
 
    return render(request, 'dhcare/doctorui-get.html', {"form": form}) 
 
 
@custom_user_passes_test(lambda u: Group.objects.get(name='DHCARE-Doctors') 
in u.groups.all()) 
def doctorui_submit(request): 
    # if this is a POST request we need to process the form data 
    if request.method == 'POST': 
        # create a form instance and populate it with data from the 
request: 
        form = submitRecords(request.POST) 
        # check whether it's valid: 
        if form.is_valid(): 
            fingerprint = form.cleaned_data.get('patient_fingerprint') 
            user = User.objects.get(username=request.user) 
            clinic_id = user.profile.department_code 
            accessRequest = accessControlSC_check(str(fingerprint), 
str(clinic_id)) 
            if accessRequest is True: 
                name = form.cleaned_data.get('record_name') 
                description = form.cleaned_data.get('record_description') 
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                date = str(form.cleaned_data.get('record_date')) 
                status = 'Active' 
                sha256_name = 
str(hashlib.sha256(name.encode()).hexdigest()) 
                sha256_description = 
str(hashlib.sha256(description.encode()).hexdigest()) 
                H1 = sha256_name + sha256_description 
                sha256_date = 
str(hashlib.sha256(date.encode()).hexdigest()) 
                sha256_status = 
str(hashlib.sha256(str(status).encode()).hexdigest()) 
                H2 = sha256_date + sha256_status 
                H3 = str(hashlib.sha256(str(H1).encode()).hexdigest()) + 
str(hashlib.sha256(str(H2).encode()).hexdigest()) 
                sha256 = str(hashlib.sha256(H3.encode()).hexdigest()) 
 
                createEHR = patientsSC_ehr_post(int(fingerprint), name, 
sha256, status, date) 
                create_ehr(sha256, description) 
 
                return render(request, 'dhcare/doctorui-submit.html', 
{'createEHR': createEHR}) 
            else: 
                return render(request, 'dhcare/doctorui-submit.html', 
{'createEHR': accessRequest}) 
 
    # if a GET (or any other method) we'll create a blank form 
    else: 
        form = submitRecords() 
 
    return render(request, 'dhcare/doctorui-submit.html', {"form": form}) 
 
Appendix E – Django HTML Templates 
about.html 
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %} 
{% block content %} 
<h1>About Page</h1> 
   <div class="w3-container"> 
      <p style="font-family: 'Raleway',sans-serif; font-size: 18px; font-
weight: 500; line-height: 32px; margin: 0 0 24px; text-align: justify; 
text-justify: inter-word; "><br> 
          DHCARE is Blockchain-Based Healthcare System that utilizes 
fingprints to identify patients and synchronize their 
          Electoric Healthcare Records (EHRs) between distributed 
healthcare providers. 
          <br><br> 
          The main features provided by DHCARE are: 
        <div style="font-family: 'Raleway',sans-serif; font-size: 18px; 
font-weight: 500; line-height: 32px; margin: 0 0 24px; text-align: justify; 
text-justify: inter-word; "> 
            <ul> 
                <li>Exchange and synchronization of EHRs between 
distributed healthcare providers</li> 
                <li>Maintaining EHRs unique patients' identity</li> 
                <li>Ensuring recoverable access to patients’ EHRs</li> 
                <li>Implementing role-based access control to EHRs</li> 
                <li>Providing anonymity to patients’ EHRs in the cloud 
datastores</li> 
                <li>Detecting unauthorized modifications to EHRs</li> 
                <li>Audit logging any activities on EHRs</li> 
            </ul> 
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        </div> 
      </p> 
    </div> 
{% endblock content %} 
 
adminui.html 
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %} 
{% load crispy_forms_tags %} 
{% load static %} 
{% block content %} 
<div class="content-section"> 
    <form method="POST"> 
        {% csrf_token %} 
        <fieldset class="form-group"> 
            <legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Admin Portal</legend> 
        </fieldset> 
        <img src="{% static 'dhcare/admin.jpg' %}" class="home-img" 
alt="Logo" width="100%"><br><br> 
        <div class="form-group"> 
            <button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url 
'adminui_get' %}" type="submit">Get Hospital 
                Information 
            </button> 
            <button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url 
'adminui_submit' %}" type="submit">Submit Hospital 
                Information 
            </button> 
        </div> 
    </form> 
</div> 
{% endblock content %} 
 
adminui-get.html 
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %} 
{% load crispy_forms_tags %} 
{% block content %} 
<div class="content-section" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/html"> 
    <form method="POST"> 
        {% csrf_token %} 
        <fieldset class="form-group"> 
            <legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Hospital 
Information</legend> 
            {{ form|crispy }} 
            {% if provider.provider_name %} 
            <div class="text-dark"> 
                <b> Hospital Name: </b>{{provider.provider_name}}<br><br> 
                <b> Hospital Web Address: 
</b>{{provider.provider_webAddress}}<br><br> 
            </div> 
            {% else %} 
            <div class="text-danger"> 
                {{provider}} 
            </div> 
            {% endif %} 
        </fieldset> 
        <button class="btn btn-outline-info" type="submit">Get 
Info</button> 
    </form> 
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</div> 
{% endblock content %} 
 
adminui-submit.html 
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %} 
{% load crispy_forms_tags %} 
{% block content %} 
<div class="content-section" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/html"> 
    <form method="POST"> 
        {% csrf_token %} 
        <fieldset class="form-group"> 
            <legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Hospital 
Information</legend> 
            {{ form|crispy }} 
            {% if providerTx %} 
            <div class="text-dark"> 
                <b> {{providerTx}} </b><br><br> 
            </div> 
            {% else %} 
            <div class="text-danger"> 
                {{providerTx}} 
            </div> 
            {% endif %} 
        </fieldset> 
        <button class="btn btn-outline-info" type="submit">Submit 
Info</button> 
    </form> 
</div> 
{% endblock content %} 
 
appointments.html 
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %} 
{% load crispy_forms_tags %} 
{% block content %} 
<div class="content-section"> 
    <form method="POST"> 
        {% csrf_token %} 
        <fieldset class="form-group"> 
            <legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Appointment 
Confirmed</legend> 
            {{accessControlSC_tx}} 
        </fieldset> 
    </form> 
</div> 
{% endblock content %} 
 
base.html 
{% load static %} 
<!DOCTYPE html> 
<html> 
<head> 
 
    <!-- Required meta tags --> 
    <meta charset="utf-8"> 
    <meta content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1, shrink-to-fit=no" 
name="viewport"> 
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    <!-- Bootstrap CSS --> 
    <link crossorigin="anonymous" 
href="https://maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.0.0/css/bootstrap.min.css
" 
    <link crossorigin="anonymous" 
href="https://maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.0.0/css/bootstrap.min.css
" 
          integrity="sha384-
Gn5384xqQ1aoWXA+058RXPxPg6fy4IWvTNh0E263XmFcJlSAwiGgFAW/dAiS6JXm" 
rel="stylesheet"> 
 
    <link href="{% static 'dhcare/main.css' %}" rel="stylesheet" 
type="text/css"> 
 
    {% if title %} 
    <title>DHCARE - {{ title }}</title> 
    {% else %} 
    <title>DHCARE</title> 
    {% endif %} 
</head> 
<body> 
<header class="site-header"> 
    <nav class="navbar navbar-expand-md navbar-dark bg-steel fixed-top"> 
        <div class="container"> 
            <a class="navbar-brand mr-4" href="{% url 'dhcare-home' 
%}">DHCARE</a> 
            <button aria-controls="navbarToggle" aria-expanded="false" 
aria-label="Toggle navigation" 
                    class="navbar-toggler" data-target="#navbarToggle" 
data-toggle="collapse" type="button"> 
                <span class="navbar-toggler-icon"></span> 
            </button> 
            <div class="collapse navbar-collapse" id="navbarToggle"> 
                <div class="navbar-nav mr-auto"> 
                    <a class="nav-item nav-link" href="{% url 'dhcare-home' 
%}">Home</a> 
                    <a class="nav-item nav-link" href="{% url 'dhcare-
about' %}">About</a> 
                </div> 
                <!-- Navbar Right Side --> 
                <div class="navbar-nav"> 
                    {% if user.is_authenticated %} 
                    <a class="nav-item nav-link" href="{% url 'logout' 
%}">Logout</a> 
                    {% if 'DHCARE-Admins' in user.groups.all.0.name %} 
                    <a class="nav-item nav-link" href="{% url 'adminui' 
%}">Admin</a> 
                    {% endif %} 
                    {% if 'DHCARE-Doctors' in user.groups.all.0.name %} 
                    <a class="nav-item nav-link" href="{% url 'doctorui' 
%}">Doctor</a> 
                    {% endif %} 
                    {% if 'DHCARE-Reception' in user.groups.all.0.name %} 
                    <a class="nav-item nav-link" href="{% url 'receptionui' 
%}">Appointments</a> 
                    {% endif %} 
                    {% else %} 
                    <a class="nav-item nav-link" href="{% url 'login' 
%}">Login</a> 
                    {% endif %} 
                </div> 
            </div> 
        </div> 
    </nav> 
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</header> 
<main class="container" role="main"> 
    <div class="row"> 
        <div class="col-md-8"> 
            {% if messages %} 
            {% for message in messages %} 
            <div class="alert alert-{{ message.tags }}"> 
                {{ message }} 
            </div> 
            {% endfor %} 
            {% endif %} 
            {% block content %}{% endblock %} 
        </div> 
    </div> 
</main> 
 
<!-- Optional JavaScript --> 
<!-- jQuery first, then Popper.js, then Bootstrap JS --> 
<script crossorigin="anonymous" integrity="sha384-
KJ3o2DKtIkvYIK3UENzmM7KCkRr/rE9/Qpg6aAZGJwFDMVNA/GpGFF93hXpG5KkN" 
        src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.2.1.slim.min.js"></script> 
<script crossorigin="anonymous" integrity="sha384-
ApNbgh9B+Y1QKtv3Rn7W3mgPxhU9K/ScQsAP7hUibX39j7fakFPskvXusvfa0b4Q" 
        
src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/popper.js/1.12.9/umd/popper.min
.js"></script> 
<script crossorigin="anonymous" integrity="sha384-
JZR6Spejh4U02d8jOt6vLEHfe/JQGiRRSQQxSfFWpi1MquVdAyjUar5+76PVCmYl" 
        
src="https://maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.0.0/js/bootstrap.min.js"><
/script> 
</body> 
</html> 
 
doctorui.html 
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %} 
{% load crispy_forms_tags %} 
{% load static %} 
{% block content %} 
<div class="content-section"> 
    <form method="POST"> 
        {% csrf_token %} 
        <fieldset class="form-group"> 
            <legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Doctor Portal</legend> 
        </fieldset> 
        <img src="{% static 'dhcare/doctor.jpg' %}" class="home-img" 
alt="Logo" width="100%"><br><br> 
        <div class="form-group"> 
            <button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url 
'doctorui-get' %}" type="submit">Get Patient Records 
            </button> 
            <button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url 
'doctorui-submit' %}" type="submit">Submit Patient 
                Records 
            </button> 
        </div> 
    </form> 
</div> 
{% endblock content %} 
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doctorui-get.html 
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %} 
{% load crispy_forms_tags %} 
{% load django_tables2 %} 
{% block content %} 
<div class="content-section" style="width:150%"> 
    <form method="POST"> 
        {% csrf_token %} 
        <fieldset class="form-group"> 
            <legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Patient Records</legend> 
            {{form|crispy}} 
            {% if getEHR %} 
                {% render_table getEHR %} 
                <div class="form-group"> 
                </div> 
            {% else %} 
                {{error}} 
            {% endif %} 
            <br><button class="btn btn-outline-info" type="submit">Get 
Records</button> 
        </fieldset> 
    </form> 
</div> 
{% endblock content %} 
 
doctorui-submit.html 
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %} 
{% load crispy_forms_tags %} 
{% block content %} 
<div class="content-section"> 
    <form method="POST"> 
        {% csrf_token %} 
        <fieldset class="form-group"> 
            <legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Doctor Portal</legend> 
            {{form|crispy}} 
            {% if createEHR %} 
                {{createEHR}} 
            {% else %} 
                <button class="btn btn-outline-info" 
type="submit">Submit</button> 
            {% endif %} 
        </fieldset> 
    </form> 
</div> 
{% endblock content %} 
 
home.html 
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %} 
{% load static %} 
{% block content %} 
    <h1 style="width:150%; color: #666; font-family: 'Consolas',sans-serif; 
font-size: 60px; font-weight: 800; line-height: 72px; margin: 0 0 10px; 
text-align: center; text-transform: uppercase;"> 
        DHCARE 
    </h1> 
    <h2 style="width:150%; color: #987; font-family: 'Calibri',sans-serif; 
font-size: 30px; font-weight: 200; line-height: 5px; margin: 0 0 60px; 
text-align: center; text-transform: uppercase;"> 
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        Biometric Distributed Healthcare System on Blockchain 
    </h2> 
    <img src="{% static 'dhcare/home.jpg' %}" class="home-img" alt="Logo" 
width="150%"><br><br><br> 
{% endblock content %} 
 
login.html 
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %} 
{% load crispy_forms_tags %} 
{% block content %} 
<div class="content-section"> 
    <form method="POST"> 
        {% csrf_token %} 
        <fieldset class="form-group"> 
            <legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Log In</legend> 
            {{ form|crispy }} 
        </fieldset> 
        <div class="form-group"> 
            <button class="btn btn-outline-info" 
type="submit">Login</button> 
        </div> 
    </form> 
</div> 
{% endblock content %} 
 
logou.html 
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %} 
{% block content %} 
<h2>You have been logged out</h2> 
<div class="border-top pt-3"> 
    <small class="text-muted"> 
        <a href="{% url 'login' %}">Log In Again</a> 
    </small> 
</div> 
{% endblock content %} 
 
new-patient.html 
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %} 
{% load crispy_forms_tags %} 
{% block content %} 
<div class="content-section"> 
    <form method="POST"> 
        {% csrf_token %} 
        <fieldset class="form-group"> 
            <legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Add Patient</legend> 
            {{ form|crispy }} 
            {% if confirmation %} 
            {{ confirmation}} 
            {% else %} 
            <button class="btn btn-outline-info" type="submit">Add</button> 
            {% endif %} 
        </fieldset> 
    </form> 
</div> 
{% endblock content %} 
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receptionui.html 
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %} 
{% load crispy_forms_tags %} 
{% load static %} 
{% block content %} 
<div class="content-section"> 
    <form method="POST"> 
        {% csrf_token %} 
        <fieldset class="form-group"> 
            <legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Reception Portal</legend> 
        </fieldset> 
        <img src="{% static 'dhcare/reception.jpg' %}" class="home-img" 
alt="Logo" width="100%"><br><br> 
        <div class="form-group"> 
            <button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url 'new-
patient' %}" type="submit">Add New Patient 
            </button> 
            <button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url 
'receptionui-get' %}" type="submit">Get Patient 
                Appointments 
            </button> 
            <button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url 
'receptionui-book' %}" type="submit">Book New 
                Appointment 
            </button> 
        </div> 
    </form> 
</div> 
{% endblock content %} 
 
receptionui-book.html 
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %} 
{% load crispy_forms_tags %} 
{% block content %} 
<div class="content-section" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/html"> 
    <form method="POST"> 
        {% csrf_token %} 
        <fieldset class="form-group"> 
            <legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Appointment Booking</legend> 
            {{ form|crispy }} 
        </fieldset> 
        <button class="btn btn-outline-info" type="submit">Book</button> 
    </form> 
</div> 
{% endblock content %} 
 
receptionui-get.html 
{% extends "dhcare/base.html" %} 
{% load crispy_forms_tags %} 
{% load django_tables2 %} 
{% block content %} 
<div class="content-section"> 
    <form method="POST"> 
        {% csrf_token %} 
        <fieldset class="form-group"> 
            <legend class="border-bottom mb-4">Patient 
Appointments</legend> 
            {{ form|crispy }} 
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            {% if table %} 
                {% render_table table %} 
                <button class="btn btn-outline-info" formaction="{% url 
'appointment-confirm' %}" type="submit">Confirm 
                </button> 
            {% else %} 
                <button class="btn btn-outline-info" 
type="submit">Get</button> 
            {% endif %} 
        </fieldset> 
    </form> 
</div> 
{% endblock content %} 
 
 
 
 
 
